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INTRODUCTION

The country of Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan in the southeast, Iran in the west,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the north, and China in the northeast, is home to over 20
million ethnically and religiously diverse people. Afghanistan is an Islamic country
divided into several tribal based groups, which follow a variety of political and religious
customs and traditions. Although considered an “Islamic Republic” today, or a
government representative of all people, in actuality, the nation’s central government
consists of the most powerful tribal groups and fighting factions in the country.
Located in the center of Asia and the Middle East, the country has long been a
key geostrategic location for the international community. In addition, its natural
resources including oil, coal, and various textiles for domestic use have made it the focus
of European influence since the 19th century. Beginning with the British Empire in the
late 1800’s, the tribes of Afghanistan have combated European expansion and have
undertaken extreme, and often times violent, political transformations in order to protect
their sovereignty and people. Amid these changes, the dynastic rule of Amanullah Khan,
Mohammad Nadir Shah, and then Mohammad Zahir Shah over Afghanistan that began in
1919 after British withdrawal from the region, began to weaken and dissipate. Liberal
reform attempting to modernize Afghanistan challenged the traditional Islamic political
framework in Afghanistan and generated the rise of Soviet Marxism and Communism in
the country. In the early 1970’s, led by Nur Mohammed Taraki, Haffizullah Amin, and
Babrak Kamal, the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan introduced
controversial social and political reforms which had several ideological ties to Soviet
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Marxism. By 1978, despite the disaffection of the Afghan people, the support of the
government in Moscow facilitated the overthrow of Sadar Mohammed Daoud Khan, the
last member of the ruling royal family, and the establishment of a Soviet government
regime within Afghanistan led by Nur Mohammed Taraki.
Marxist-style reform under the newly established government competed with
Afghan traditions and customs. Violent opposition to the Marxist Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan developed quickly into a nation-wide insurgency. The growing insurgency
ultimately pressured Moscow to initiate change in its government regime in Afghanistan.
In September of 1979, Hafizullah Amin overthrew Taraki for control in the Democratic
Republic. However, the Soviet backed political party still faced a large Afghan
insurgency, which continued to weaken its morale and strength in the country. Despite
increased military assistance and aid to equip the Afghan Army to protect the political
regime, the insurgency effectively challenged the Afghan Army. By December 27, 1979,
Soviet forces landed in Kabul and began a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan to support
the government.
The Soviet-Afghan War was the catalyst for increased hostilities between the
United States and the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. The war between the Soviet Union and
a majority of the people of Afghanistan began with the Soviet invasion in December of
1979 and ended with the ascension of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1989.
Prior to the Soviet invasion, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in
the context of the Cold War were marked by détente, a period of eased relations between
the political leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, each recognizing the
other’s nuclear capability of mutually assured destruction. The Soviet invasion of
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Afghanistan and the Afghan-Soviet War itself marked the end of the period known as
détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Afghan people found
themselves in a losing battle against the more advanced Soviet Union, the United States
government, under President Carter and throughout the presidency of Ronald Reagan,
began to utilize its alliance with Pakistan to provide monetary and military aid to various
groups and leaders of the Afghan insurgency or Mujahadeen.
During the war, the monetary aid and military training and assistance provided by
the CIA, State Department and National Security Council to Afghan insurgents,
combined with the Afghan insurgent’s extensive knowledge of the region, enabled the
Mujahadeen to effectively combat the Soviet Union’s military forces. Ultimately in 1989,
the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan.
U.S. involvement in the Afghan-Soviet War forced the Soviet Union into
excessive spending, which created a political and economic situation from which it could
not recover. With the Soviet Union defeated, the future of Afghanistan was uncertain
both among its people and the United States government. Soon after the Soviet Union’s
withdrawal, Afghanistan erupted into civil war. Mujahadeen leaders and the Taliban were
competing for power and control over Afghanistan. By 1996, through acts of political
manipulation, persuasion, and terror, the Taliban effectively gained control of
Afghanistan. In 2001, the United States re-engaged itself in the region in response to the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and after the discovery of the Taliban’s hosting of
Osama Bin Laden.
Although the history of U.S. foreign policy and involvement in Afghanistan
during the Afghan-Soviet War and after the Soviet withdrawal has been studied and
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examined by numerous scholars and historians, this period of U.S. history still poses
questions that can be further explored. In particular, what was the true extent of the
relationship between the United States and Mujahadeen during the Soviet war? What
were U.S. perceptions and evaluations of the Mujahadeen during the war? And finally,
what are the implications of the history of U.S. relations with the Mujahadeen and its
leaders, during and after the war, upon the nation’s relations with the Soviet Union during
the Cold War and its most recent history in Afghanistan?
In answering these questions, not only will the history of the Afghan-Soviet War
and U.S. involvement in the war be examined, but also, and more importantly, the ways
in which the larger geostrategic engagement between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War blurred American policymakers sensibilities towards the
conflict among Islamic groups and leaders of the Mujahadeen during the war period will
be assessed. Furthermore, the consequences of U.S. policymakers approach to the
Afghan-Soviet War from a Cold War perspective will be evaluated.
Several existing studies by numerous scholars and historians regarding the
Afghan-Soviet War and its aftermath are available in order conduct a deeper historical
analysis of this period of U.S. history.
History of the Afghan-Soviet War and U.S. Involvement: A Comparative Analysis
The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time, by
Odd Arne Westad, provides a retrospective historical overview of U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan, specifically under the Reagan administration, in the context of a broader

4

study of the international Cold War.1 In examining the Afghan-Soviet War in 2007, in
addition to U.S. involvement in the war, Westad, an award winning author and professor
of Cold War history at the London School of Economics, discusses how the U.S. and
Soviet Cold War, preceding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, shaped both the
“international and the domestic framework within which political, social, and cultural
changes in Third World countries took place.”2 In other words, Westad contends that the
United States and Soviet Union were driven to subjecting the “Third World” country of
Afghanistan to their ideologies and political methods in order to prove their applicability
and create a new ally in their competition for power. In doing so, the conflicting
ideological and political structures that were impressed upon the various Afghan leaders
by the U.S. and Soviet Union during the anti-Soviet jihad resulted in tension between the
U.S. ideas and models of government and those of the Afghan people, during and after
the war. It is the “new imperialism” exhibited by the Soviet Union and U.S. during the
Afghan-Soviet War, on the part of the U.S. that led to an Afghanistan torn by civil war
and a country eventually led by the Taliban and anti-American terrorist leaders.
The book entitled, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal,
by Diego Corodvez and Selig S. Harrison also provides an analysis of the Afghan-Soviet
War from 1973 to 1988.3 Written in 1995, only five years after the complete Soviet
withdrawal, Corodvez, the U.N. special representative for Afghanistan during the war,
and Harrison, a journalist and scholar who specializes in South and East Asian affairs and
a senior fellow at both the Center for International Policy and the Woodrow Wilson
1

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Ibid, 3
3 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2
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International Center for Scholars, provide a broader, yet detailed, analysis of the war than
does Odde Arne Westad by covering the history of the war through the Soviet withdrawal
in six parts. Corodvez and Harrison examine how the Soviet Union decided to invade
Afghanistan, the extent of Soviet occupation, the resistance met by the Soviet Union from
Afghan rebel forces, the amount and type of aid provided by the U.S. government to
Afghan forces, and how the Soviet Union eventually decided to withdraw from
Afghanistan.
Indeed, in examining these particular aspects of the Afghan-Soviet War,
Corodvez and Harrison argue that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan not only to
reach the Indian Ocean or to spread Communism, but also in order to gain a strategic
advantage over the United States, the world’s only other superpower.4 Corodvez and
Harrison contend that not only did the unique guerilla warfare exhibited by the Afghan
Mujahadeen lead to the Soviet withdrawal, but also, and more importantly, the Afghan
rebel leader’s alliance with the United States raised the costs, in both human and
economic terms, upon Moscow leading to their eventual diplomatic agreement to
withdraw. As demonstrated by Corodvez and Harrison, the allocation of American
money and weaponry to Afghan rebel leaders and groups of the Mujahadeen, although
difficult and highly controversial within Washington during the war, contributed to the
Soviet defeat and withdrawal. It is the relationship between the Mujahadeen and the
United States during the war which played a pivotal role in the United States history
during the Cold War with the Soviet Union and in the nation’s most recent history in
Afghanistan.

4

Ibid, 49.
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Hooshang Amirahmadi’s, The United States and the Middle East: A Search for
New Perspectives, is a collection of scholarly essays and arguments providing a historical
analysis of U.S. Middle East policy.5 In his historical overview of the Cold War,
comprised of several different opinions and contentions by historians such as Richard
Cottam, Richard Falk, and Carl Brown, Amirahmadi demonstrates the roots of U.S.
involvement in the Middle East and the shortcomings of U.S. foreign policy in
Afghanistan. In doing so, Amirahmadi argues much like Westad that the United States,
despite its superpower status, continues to experience crisis after crisis rather than
stability in the Middle East, specifically Afghanistan. However, in contrast with Westad,
Amirmahdi goes a step further in affirming that a change in U.S. foreign policy within
Afghanistan must be made.
In discussing Afghanistan’s political and social structure, Amirmahdi maintains
that since the Cold War, the U.S. government, in its entirety, has misconceived the
position of Afghan leaders in the Middle East and their role in the religious politics
within Afghanistan. Furthermore, Amirmahdi primarily addresses the civil war chaos in
Afghanistan after the Afghan-Soviet War and contends that there were fundamental flaws
in U.S. strategic policy towards the Persian Gulf, particularly Afghanistan. Although
Hooshang Amirmahdi wrote his book in 1993, during the civil war following the AfghanSoviet War, he recognizes that the “unwarranted emphasis on the Soviet threat to the
region, and the misplaced confidence in the U.S. ability to protect its interests militarily”
through monetary and military aid to the Mujahadeen during the Afghan-Soviet War led
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Hooshang Amirahmadi, The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives (Albany:
State of University New York Press, 1993).
Hooshang Amirahmadi is the president of the American Iranian Council and director of Rutger
University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies and the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis.

7

to the U.S. government to engage in failed foreign policy to politically organize
Afghanistan in the postwar period. Indeed, it is Amirahmadi’s thesis regarding U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East, based on U.S. history in Afghanistan during the Cold
War, which is important to an understanding of the relationship between the U.S.
government, and the Mujahadeen and its leaders, during the war, and the consequences of
the relationship after the Soviet withdrawal.
Steven Coll’s, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin
Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, follows a similar approach to the
Afghan-Soviet War as Westad and Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, but provides
more of an in-depth historical analysis of the events prior to, during, and after the Soviet
war, and the extent of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.6 Providing not just a Soviet
perspective but also an American perspective, Ghost Wars is considered one of the most
comprehensive books today on the Afghan-Soviet War and the extent of U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan. Published after 9/11 in 2004, Coll tracks the events of the
Cold War from the attack on the U.S embassy in Islamabad to the rise of international
terrorism until September 10, 2001. Indeed, in contrast to Hooshang Amirmahdi, Coll
provides a deeper inside look into the workings of the U.S. government, specifically the
State Department, National Security Council, and most of all, the CIA, during and after
the Cold War in Afghanistan and in the United States.
Coll discusses the U.S relationship with the governments of Pakistan and the
Saudi Arabia, and the groups and leaders of the Mujahadeen, through these different
6

Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).
Steven Coll is a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and author. He served as a staff writer for The New Yorker
and The Washington Post during the time of the Afghan-Soviet War and has written several books on the
Middle East and U.S. foreign relations.
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sections of the U.S. government, and particularly the CIA, during and after the Soviet
invasion. Coll also demonstrates that America’s involvement in Afghanistan during the
war, and relationship with several Afghan leaders, such as Ahmed Shah Massoud and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, led to a campaign on the part of U.S. government officials to put
into place a reliable ally and leader for Afghanistan. Parallel to Odd Arne Westad, Coll
reveals that this was based on the U.S. goal to establish not only Afghanistan as an ally,
but also ensure the ascension of an Afghan leader who could incorporate and maintain
American political and economic influence, values and ideas in the region. However, in
doing so, Coll, much like Amirmahdi, contends that the United States government and
CIA effectively dismantled their cooperative relationship with the Afghan people, and the
Mujahadeen and its leaders within the region that they had dealt with during the war.
Furthermore, Coll demonstrates that as a result of this, the U.S. government became
faced with an internal and external struggle with the Taliban as they gained control over
the country, and created an Afghanistan that became a sanctuary for terrorism.
From this historical analysis of the Afghan Cold War in the aftermath of 9/11,
Coll argues that America’s official and unofficial covert action in training and aiding the
Mujahadeen, financially and militarily, ultimately led to a change in Cold War politics
between the United States and Soviet Union, the Soviet withdrawal, and more
importantly what would become the United States’ “War on Terror” within the region.
The Afghan-Soviet War and the clandestine terrorism and counterterrorism that followed
as Afghanistan experienced civil war, ushered in a new era of U.S. foreign policy and a
new chapter in U.S. history.
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Parallel to Coll’s examination of the aftermath of the Afghan Soviet war, Larry
Goodson’s book entitled, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics,
and the Rise of the Taliban, evaluates the decades of military and political turmoil, and
fighting within Afghanistan for power.7 Although the history is the same, the historical
analysis of this period by Goodson is much different from that conducted by Odd Arne
Westad and Steve Coll. As director and associate professor of Middle East studies at the
U.S. Army War College, Goodson breaks down the Afghan-Soviet War and its aftermath
in Afghanistan into “seven discrete stages”. From the invasion of Afghanistan by the
Soviet Union, to a civil war between Ahmed Shah Massoud, Hekmatayar, and the
Taliban, to the ultimate rise of the Taliban, Goodson sheds light on the extent of not only
the U.S. military influence in Afghanistan during the war but also the level of influence
the U.S. had on Afghanistan’s changing political system. In particular, Goodson
discusses the attempt in the late 1980’s of U.S. government officials, specifically in the
CIA and State Department, to bring forth the rise of Ahmed Shah Massoud, a leader
within the Mujahadeen, as Pakistan and the ISI contributed to attempts made by
Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, a more extreme fundamentalist leader of the Mujahadeen, to gain
control of Kabul in the post-war period. Although Goodson does not directly comment on
U.S. perceptions of the Mujahadeen during and after the war, he does reveal that the
United States government saw potential in the Mujahadeen and its leaders, specifically
Ahmed Shah Massoud, to form a stable government in Afghanistan that could be a
desirable ally for the U.S. in the Middle East following the war.

7

Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the
Taliban (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).
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Although Goodson and Coll comment on U.S.-Afghan relations through 2001,
they have different views of its transition from the Afghan-Soviet War to the postwar
period. Compared to Steve Coll’s argument that U.S. official and unofficial covert aid to
the Mujahadeen during and after the war facilitated the rise of internal civil war in
Afghanistan and terrorism towards the U.S., Goodson argues that the rise of terrorism
against the U.S. was linked with the U.S. government’s lack of understanding of the
ethnic and religious divisions within the country during and after the war and the rise of
the Taliban over U.S. backed leaders of the Mujahadeen in the post-war period. The
policy of the CIA and State Department to continue to arm the Mujahadeen during and
after the war while shifting from a policy of simply defeating the Soviet Union to one of
nation building, and the decimation and decline of the Afghan population during the
Afghan-Soviet War, in Goodson’s view, created a chain reaction that produced political
and economic instability within the region. According to Goodson, although the Afghan
refugee crisis was given its due attention by the U.S. government, these consequences of
the Soviet invasion were ignored by the United States during the war, whose sole mission
at that time was to ensure the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Even though it
was these factors in this downward spiral of Afghanistan that created a demand not only
among the Afghan people, but also the U.S., for a new leader within the country after the
war, by then it was too late to avoid a civil war. The instability in Afghanistan sparked
civil war and a social and cultural change within Afghanistan, which in turn led to a
backlash against the United States, accompanied by the rise of terrorism and the Taliban
organization in the post war era.
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In Eden Naby and Ralph H. Magnus’s book, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and the
Mujahid, the aftermath of the Afghan Soviet war is also discussed.8 However, in
comparison to the analyses presented by Coll and Goodson, Naby and Magnus focus on
the transition of the Mujahadeen from a fighting force during the war to an Islamic
political movement and organization after the war. Although the extent of U.S. aid and
involvement with the Mujahadeen during the Afghan-Soviet War and after the war is not
as thoroughly explored in this book, Naby and Magnus do elaborate on the armed conflict
between the Afghan rebel forces and the Soviet Union, and among their leaders once the
war ended. Furthermore, in looking at pre- and post- Soviet Afghanistan, Naby and
Magnus discuss Islamic politics between Afghanistan’s Tajiks and Pashtuns, the
international aspects impacting Islamic politics, culture, and economic circumstances,
and the eventual rise of the Taliban in contemporary Afghanistan. By doing so, Naby and
Magnus shed light on the confounding reality of the country of Afghanistan as a major
“Third World” player in the international system and as source of conflict in its relations
with other countries, primarily the United States, after the war.
In addition to the historical analysis presented by Eden Naby and Ralph H.
Magnus, historian Brian Glyn Williams book entitled, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide
to America’s Longest War, also evaluates the history of Afghanistan, but primarily
focuses on the post-Soviet period.9 Although the discussion of Islamic politics within
Afghanistan is not as thoroughly examined compared to the book by Naby and Magnus,
8

Eden Naby and Ralph H. Magnus, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and the Mujahid (Boulder: Westview
Press, 2002).
Eden Naby is a respected and renowned historian of Central Asia and the Middle East, and reported for
CBS during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Ralph H. Magnus has written several books regarding the
invasion of Afghanistan and the perceptual and strategic security of the Persian Gulf in the 1980’s.
9 Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
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Williams, provides a perspective regarding the Afghan-Soviet War and the internal civil
war for power that ensued among Afghan leaders, such as Ahmed Shah Massoud and
Hekmatyar, following the Soviet withdrawal. In his discussion, Williams, like Coll,
contends that U.S. military armament and funding to various Afghan rebel groups and
leaders during and after the Soviet invasion heightened the ensuing civil war between
Afghan leaders. Furthermore, according to Williams, this led to a “boomerang style
blowback” for the U.S. government in form of a strained relationship with Afghanistan
and the growth of terrorism against the United States.
The history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War,
and the perceptions and evaluations of the U.S. relationship with the Mujahadeen and
several Afghan leaders during the war, has several implications with regard to the
nation’s involvement in the region in the post Soviet period, from the internal civil war to
the “War on Terror”. In drawing from the analyses conducted by historians and scholars
in the past and present, the history of the Afghan-Soviet War, the civil war that led to the
rise of the Taliban in the post Soviet war period, and the rise of Afghanistan within the
international system, will be thoroughly researched. More importantly, the political and
military relationship between the people and leaders of Afghanistan and the United States
will be assessed in order to reveal that the larger geostrategic engagement between the
United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War blurred American
policymakers’ sensibilities towards the conflict among Islamic groups and leaders of the
Mujahadeen.
In addition, the failure of the U.S. government to properly address the political
and military instability and the division and competition between Mujahadeen factions
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and leaders during and after the war undermined U.S. aspirations to successfully enact a
policy of American style nation building in the region during the post-war period. Given
that nation building marked the final transition in U.S. foreign policy at the end of the
Afghan-Soviet War and into the post-war period, it is important to assess the theoretical
literature on and framework of this form of U.S. foreign policy in order to properly
understand the aftermath of the conflict.
Despite its practice as a tenet of United States foreign policy, there is no doctrine,
document, or guide to the activities and actions, diplomatic or militaristic, with regard to
U.S nation building. Although this form of U.S. foreign policy has been heavily debated
among scholars and historians, it is generally agreed upon that it is a unique policy of the
United States involving the intervention in foreign countries, whether by force or
international organizations, in order to rebuild the political, economic, and social
infrastructure of a particular nation, and democratize its institutions and people.
For the purposes of this analysis, a hybrid definition of nation building is
provided. According to Carolyn Stephenson, nation building is the intervention, whether
by force or international organization, in the affairs of a foreign nation state, particularly
those that are dysfunctional, unstable, “failed”, or “rogue” states, typically in the
aftermath of a conflict or unrest, for the purposes of changing the state’s political,
economic, and social infrastructure. It is indeed more of an evolutionary process rather
than a revolutionary one, in that it takes a long time for a nation to re-develop its
political, economic, and social processes, and more importantly its overall identity within
the international system.10

10

Carolyn Stephenson, “Nation Building” (Beyond Intractability Project, 2005), 1.

14

There are several independent variables impacting the United State’s decision to
participate and engage in nation building. In the years before and after the end of the
Afghan-Soviet War, the U.S. was interested in securing the independence and selfdetermination of the Afghan people, but was more concerned with establishing a stable
government in Afghanistan comprised of leaders that not only represented the interests of
Afghanistan, but also, and more importantly, the interests, ideals and values of the United
States.
In addition, it was believed that through the establishment of a stable government
and economic system in Afghanistan, the United States government would be able to
secure and further other important interests. For example, the U.S. was searching for
another stable ally in the region in addition to Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
Underlying U.S. aid to the Mujahadeen during the war and in the post-war era was the
aspiration of U.S. policymakers to make Afghanistan a reliable and formidable ally in the
Middle East. Indeed, the Middle East, particularly Afghanistan, before and after the war,
was an unstable region founded and grounded on traditional principles in the Islamic
faith, which were understood differently and had conflicting levels of significance among
the multitude of ethnic groups in the region. As a result, stability was difficult to achieve
and violent unrest was constant. This posed a threat to not only U.S. security and political
interests and influence, but also to U.S. economic interests, specifically with regard to oil
investments in the region. Through the establishment of an American-style political and
economic infrastructure in Afghanistan, U.S. officials believed that Afghanistan could
maintain its self-determination, become a reliable ally within an unstable region, and
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would secure important U.S. interests and the spread of U.S. ideals and values in the
Middle East.
In addition to America’s national interests which form the backbone of U.S
foreign policy, there are several other variables that also impact the United States
decision to participate in the policy of nation building. Based on the analyses of nation
building by James Dobbins and Ray Jennings Salvatore, the particular nation-state within
the international system in need of assistance or change from the American perspective is
a concern for U.S. policymakers’ planning to pursue nation building. Nation building is
an act conducted by the U.S. government to ensure the advancement of United States
hegemony, influence, and security. The nature of the conflict in which the nation-state in
question is involved, and the context in which the act of nation building is performed are
also important factors. In other words, is it necessary for the United States to intervene
militarily or diplomatically? Will involvement in the particular conflict forward
American interests or threaten U.S security? Will the act of nation building by the United
States after conflict be appropriate or will this threaten American security, interests, and
image?
Furthermore, Dobbins, much like Salvatore, contends that the United States’
decision to participate in nation building is also based on the status of the country in
which the U.S plans to intervene. Indeed, U.S foreign policy officials have to consider,
what is the existing condition of the nation-state’s economy, government, and social
homogeneity? Furthermore U.S foreign policy officials must address whether it is better
for the U.S to nation build multilaterally or unilaterally? As the hegemon in the system,
can the United States intervene alone or is it in fact necessary or more advantageous, to

16

rely on the support of allies or international organizations? In relation to this important
factor influencing nation building is another, involving an assessment of U.S military,
economic, and diplomatic resources. Specifically, depending on the conflict and country
at hand, does the United States have the troops, money, time, and soft power necessary
and at its disposal to intervene and re-develop a particular nation state?11
The act of nation building by the United States requires sufficient economic and
military resources to ensure that the nation in question can be restructured and
reindustrialized properly and can carry on its changes and advancements into the future.
The careful and systematic use of economic and military power and resources by the
United States, in the form of troops, money, and machinery, has shown with the
rebuilding and advancement of Germany and Japan after WWII, that these aspects of
nation building efforts are of utmost importance.12 The United States will ensure the
success of their nation building efforts if it also establishes an appropriate exit strategy
and if need be, an exit deadline for its political or military forces. A flexible exit strategy
and deadline are indeed important in order to accommodate the objectives of the mission
and changes that might occur in response to events at home or abroad, and the
progression of the country in question.13
In addition, although Dobbins believes sufficient monetary and military resources
are necessary to successfully conduct nation building, Marina Ottaway argues that it is
essential to have the cooperation of the populace within the nation-state in question.

11

James Dobbins, “Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower”
(RAND Corporation, 2003), 1; Ray Jennings Salvatore, “The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building
from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq” (Peaceworks, Volume 49, 2003), 6-7.
12 James Dobbins, “Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower”
(RAND Corporation, 2003), 1-3.
13 Ibid, 2.
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Without public support very little can be effectively established or accomplished,
especially when changing their usual political, social, and economic framework. To
achieve this end, the United States has to show that their nation building efforts are not
only for U.S interests but also, and more importantly, for those of the people whose lives
are being altered by U.S actions. Moreover, the United States has to demonstrate that
their changes to the nation-state’s overall infrastructure is for the better and that they will
lead to the development of sustained stability, peace, and individual and national
prosperity and power. In conjunction with this, the United States must also actively
exhibit that their nation building efforts will maintain the particular nation-state’s cultural
and ethnic identity as the infrastructure and image of the nation changes.14 The United
States should not aim to and does not aim to transform a nation-state to directly resemble
the United States. Consequently, the United States hopefully will gain the cooperation of
the people within the state in question, ensure its prosperity and stability, secure an ally in
the system, and ultimately advance U.S hegemony and interests.
Moreover, Ottaway demonstrates that one of the most significant inquiries to
address in determining what comprises a successful act of nation building on the part of
the U.S, is whether the U.S should engage in this act through the use of its military or
nongovernmental institutions, and whether the U.S should engage in this act
multilaterally or unilaterally.15 It is clear that the use of the military in the act of nation
building is effective. The United States military is one of the strongest militaries in the
world and in enforcing changes within a particular nation it is important to have the

Marina Ottaway, “Think Again: Nation Building” (Foreign Policy, 2002), 2; Ray Jennings Salvatore,
“The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq”
(Peaceworks, Volume 49, 2003), 26-29.
15 Ibid, 1.
14
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ability to control the people within the nation in question and any resistance that
develops. Furthermore, the presence of the military in U.S nation building efforts
provides the perception of defeat among and a commanding influence over the populace
within the state in question in addition to a well-structured form of leadership that can
lead to success, as evidenced in Japan and Germany.16
However, the use of the military by the U.S can generate public perception that
the United States is aggressive and imperialistic, and in the end, does not have their best
interest in mind. This could lead to resistance, and ultimately unsuccessful nation
building. As a result, it might in fact be best to combine peacekeeping forces of the UN,
nongovernmental organizations, and military personnel, in order to impress upon the
people within the nation-state in question and the international system that the United
States nation building efforts are peaceful rather than imperialistic.17
Finally, according to Jayne Carson, the United States government must take into
account the context and time period in which they are deciding to carry out nation
building. For example, the act of nation building that occurred in Germany and Japan
followed a world war, U.S victory, and U.S rise to the status of an international
superpower. Both nations’ infrastructures were devastated and with the U.S victory in the
war, the act of nation building was most appropriate as the Soviet Union began to
challenge the United States position as the hegemont within the system and influence
within Europe. A national interest, in terms of maintaining U.S. power and influence, and
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challenging Soviet Communism with American democracy, were at stake and a major
part of U.S nation building efforts after WWII.18
Through an examination and evaluation of the Afghan-Soviet War, it is clear that
Afghanistan exemplified a country in need of nation building. Yet the research will also
demonstrate that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan throughout the Afghan-Soviet War
was based on the context of the Cold War. In the pursuit of victory over the Soviet Union
in the Cold War, and implanting U.S. political and economic ideas and values in
Afghanistan and the Middle East, American policymakers neglected the cultural and
religious factors impacting Afghanistan’s infrastructure, and the growing social, political,
and military unrest, instability, and divisions between factions and leaders of the
Mujahadeen during and after the war. As a result, the United States government
experienced difficulty and ultimately failed in abiding by the principles and guidelines of
successful
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SOVIET INVASION, THE RISE OF THE MUJAHADEEN, AND THE
TRANSITION IN U.S. POLICY
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979 was a major turning
point in the history of the Cold War and has shaped Middle East politics down to the
present day. The Soviet Union, in pursuit of advancing its Marxist-Leninist government,
its authority internationally, and its geostrategic position in the Cold War with the United
States, attempted to influence and ultimately change the political, economic, and social
infrastructure of Afghanistan. Although the Soviet Union’s involvement in Afghanistan
began diplomatically, it eventually erupted into a nine-year war and international conflict
between Afghan “holy warriors” or the Mujahadeen and Soviet forces. In fighting against
the Soviet Union, the Mujahadeen received military and economic aid from various
countries, specifically, Pakistan and the United States. After years of fighting and
military deadlock, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. The AfghanSoviet War, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and the victory of the
Afghan Mujahadeen was indeed a monumental moment in history and can be considered
the single most important catalyst that led to the downfall of the Soviet Union and the
victory of the United States in the Cold War.
The extent of U.S. involvement, in terms of military and economic support for the
Mujahadeen, during the Afghan-Soviet War was tremendous. However, the larger Cold
War engagement with the Soviet Union during this time overshadowed American
policymaker’s sensibilities towards the true aspirations of the Afghan people, the political
21

and economic disunion and disorganization of the Afghan nation, the importance of
Afghan traditionalist values, religion, ideology, and ethnicity to the political and social
fabric of the country, and the internal conflict among Islamic social groups, their leaders,
and more importantly the leaders of the Mujahadeen within Afghanistan during and after
the war. During the Afghan-Soviet War these factors were ignored by U.S. policymakers,
the President of the United States, and members of the CIA, the National Security
Council, and the State Department who viewed the war from a Cold War perspective.
This has led to serious consequences and implications that have persisted to the present
day with regards to the development of Afghanistan, and U.S. relations with the country
and the Middle East. In order to properly understand this argument it is first important to
examine the nature of the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union, the political,
economic and social environment within Afghanistan, and the relationship between the
Soviet Union, and the U.S. with Afghanistan, prior to the Soviet invasion.
After their temporary wartime alliance against Nazi Germany in the Second
World War, the United States and the Soviet Union began competition for global
supremacy and influence. The United States and the Soviet Union never directly engaged
each other militarily, for fear of what clearly would become a nuclear confrontation. Yet
both did engage in a series of proxy wars, challenging each other’s military strength and
core political, economic, and social ideas and values, especially when influencing other
nations to align with them and adopt their systems of government. It is through this
international conflict that the Soviet Union and the U.S. became involved in the Middle
East and more specifically Afghanistan.
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Throughout the Cold War the United States government operated under the belief
that “what is America today will be the world tomorrow.”1 It is this ideology that framed
the policies of U.S. foreign policy during American intervention in the Third World,
particularly Afghanistan. Although considered a military conflict, the Cold War was an
ideological competition, in which the core ideas and political and economic values that
are the foundation of American society such as liberty, democracy, centralized political
power, anti-collectivism, capitalism, and individualism, motivated U.S. policymakers to
expand across the globe, to become what some historians have considered to be a
“transoceanic imperialist power”, and to develop other nations in their image.2 Over time
in the twentieth century, as historian Odd Arne Westad argues, American policymakers
have disguised in their rhetoric the notions of colonization and imperialism, and
transforming the world into a “global America” with the idea that it is the duty of the
United States to secure the “freedom and independence” of others outside U.S. borders.3
However, during the Cold War, behind each strategy, alliance and intervention, “lay a
conviction that what had worked for the United States would also work for the world.”4
Although this interpretation of U.S. foreign policy and intervention has and continues to
be heavily debated by scholars and historians, it is an important consideration when
understanding the underlying pursuits of policies dictating U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan. Indeed, the principal ideologies, values, and interests of the U.S. during the
Cold War were used as a pretext or excuse for intervention when Communism was
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construed as a threat. In the case of Afghanistan it was at the point of the Soviet invasion
in 1979.
The same understanding of the Cold War from an American perspective also
holds true for the Soviet Union following the Second World War. Like the U.S., the
Soviet Union during the Cold War sought to modernize and influence other nations
across the globe to accept Communist core political, economic and social values as their
own. For the Soviet Union it was not a capitalist economic system but “class-based
collective action” that would lead to the democratization and social advancement of all
classes of people.5 For the Soviet Union, Communism and socialism were the keys to
modernity and “social justice”, and they had to expand internationally.6
The actions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan demonstrate what
Westad terms “new imperialism”. This is a period in which the intervention of the United
States and Soviet Union transformed conventional notions of colonialism and
imperialism into a new form of imperialism or “welfare colonialism”.7 The aims of such
imperialism translated into major changes for the improvement, not necessarily
subjugation, of the host nation’s political, economic and social infrastructure, and
national identity. Yet, this form of imperialism did keep the host nation in either the
Soviet Union’s or United States’ sphere of influence.
During the Cold War, the political, economic, and military aid provided by the
Soviet Union and the United States under this form of imperialism was usually
welcomed. However the unequal distribution of power and the ideological division
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between the Soviet Union and the United States, which characterized the Cold War, led
to difficulties for both international powers. Specifically, in Afghanistan, problems arose
in terms of implementing long-term reform, rebuilding Afghanistan, and the animosity
and resistance by Afghan citizens who were attached to more religious and traditional
values.
Afghanistan is first and foremost ethnically diverse and is divided by racial and
tribal boundaries. In 1979 there were approximately 20 ethnic groups, particularly the
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and the Uzbeks, that were, and continue to be, spread across
the region. Although each group is unified in language and faith in Islam, each has their
own set of values, social and political institutions, and more importantly, forms of
religious practice. Furthermore, “tribalism”, tribal identity, and tribal loyalty are primary
sources of division among the peoples of Afghanistan.8 For many of the tribal
communities within the ethnic groups of Afghanistan, “the allegiance of the individual
almost never goes beyond the tribal unit.”9 The Pashtuns have been the largest in number
and most dominant tribally based ethnic group within Afghanistan since the 18th century,
and the Pashtuns have been the source of traditional leadership in Afghanistan.10 The
Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group and are scattered throughout the eastern and
western parts of Afghanistan. Although the Tajiks are not tribal in their roots like the
Pashtun, they do have a strong sense of community loyalty and identity. The Uzbek and
Hazara ethnic groups are much smaller than the Pashtun and Tajik populations, but do
have significant influence in the mountain ranges of the northern and western regions of
8
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Afghanistan.11 Although each group lives within Afghanistan, each has religious and
ethnic ties to neighboring Islamic countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran.12 The United
States was aware of Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity and its influence on the political,
economic and social infrastructure of the region but it was not a central focus in the war
period and post war period. The violence that exists to this day among the many ethnic
groups and divisions in Afghanistan are primarily based on their differences in practicing
Islam. Islam has different roles, meanings, and levels of significance to each individual
ethnic group and thus generates conflict in the political and social cohesion of the
country.13 However, the connections between groups of Afghan individuals based on
tribal loyalty and faith in Islam form the bases of Afghanistan’s political and social order
and identity.
In addition, Afghanistan’s rugged and mountainous terrain also impacts its social,
cultural, political character by furthering the divisions among the country’s ethnic groups,
decentralizing and disseminating political authority across the country, removing the
Afghan people from their government, and isolating the country’s development
internationally.14 Yet the country’s geographical location and natural resources have
made it attractive to other countries and international powers. Afghanistan is at the heart
of the Middle East and borders fellow Islamic nations such as Pakistan and Iran.
Furthermore, the Afghan territory is rich with natural resources such as gold, copper,
iron, ore, and, more importantly oil.15
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It is these unique characteristics and significant social and cultural factors that are
the foundations of the Afghan nation, which both the Soviet Union and the United States
government chose to marginalize in their foreign policy and strategy during the AfghanSoviet War as part of their larger Cold War conflict. It was not until the end of the
Afghan-Soviet War and the Cold War with the Soviet Union that the United States
government began to consider the true importance, magnitude, and long-term foreign
policy implications of Afghanistan’s traditional values, ethnic bonds, and religion upon
the nations future political, economic, and social framework in the post-war period.
Afghanistan’s rural and traditional, nature has been a primary factor contributing
to its long history of imperialism and foreign intervention in the country. The pursuit to
transform Afghanistan into an ally and modern nation that was politically, economically,
and socially stable led to the British attempt establish dominion over the country in the
early nineteenth century. The British sought to reconstruct Afghanistan into a modernized
ally in order to use it as a buffer to secure British interests in India from other
international powers, particularly Russia. However, political unrest within India, and the
strength of tribal and religious roots that make up Afghanistan’s social and political
fabric led to a number of difficulties for British officials. The onset of large-scale
resistance ultimately led to the withdrawal of British political and military officials in
1919. It was the departure of the British from Afghanistan that paved the way for Russian
involvement in the country by the mid 1920’s.16
Soviet concentration in Afghanistan progressed slowly with the formation of
small Marxist-Leninist coalitions and groups within the country, primarily around the
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capital of Kabul. However, throughout the early twentieth century the Soviet Union’s
interests were inwardly focused, concerned more with the promotion of a consolidated
socialist Soviet state comprised of neighboring nations that had ethnic and cultural ties to
Russia.
It was not until the mid twentieth century, that the Soviet Union’s political agenda
included expanding its influence and Communism into the Middle East, particularly
Afghanistan. During the 1950’s the Soviet Union engaged in a series of diplomatic
initiatives, including economic, technical, and military assistance to Afghanistan. In
1956, the Soviet Union began to influence the Afghan Army as they entered a $32.4
million arms deal with Afghanistan.17 Although the appeal of Soviet Communism grew
among some Afghans by the 1970’s, Communism and Marxist coalitions, particularly the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan or PDPA, within Afghanistan had little
political reach. Afghanistan was still governed by a king, Mohammed Zahir Shah.
However, Soviet coalitions in Afghanistan received support from the government in
Moscow, which facilitated their preparations for a large-scale revolutionary movement in
the region.
By the 1960’s, the Communist coalitions in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union’s
influence in the country expanded exponentially as prime minister and future President
Mohammed Da’ud Khan began a campaign to establish liberal reforms for the
educational and economic modernization of Afghanistan.18 After a coup against the royal
government in 1973, President Da’ud, suspected to have been supported by Moscow in
his rise, called upon the Soviet Union to provide aid through the PDPA. By 1978, the
17
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Soviet Union had appropriated a total of $1.25 billion in military assistance to the Afghan
army.19 Although the royal government was well aware of the dangers of internal Soviet
involvement in the country throughout the 1970’s, the PDPA continued to gather support
from thousands of Afghan intellectuals and students, and its agents soon found their way
into the government bureaucracies.
In 1978, with revolt escalating among religious traditionalists towards Da’ud’s
policies advocating liberal reforms and the centralization of political authority in
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union government and the PDPA decided that more aggressive
action was necessary in order to ensure the modernization and establishment of Soviet
Communism in the country. On April 27, 1978, the PDPA led by Nur Mohammad
Taraki, secretary Babrak Karmal and Taraki’s right hand man, Hafizullah Amin, who was
a high ranking official of the Afghan military at the time, staged a successful coup against
the Da’ud government in Kabul and effectively took control over the political
infrastructure of Afghanistan. The leaders of the Soviet coup contended that it was a “true
social and political revolution for the masses”, yet the true aims of the Soviet Union
reflected a Cold War reality.20 The Soviet Union was primarily concerned with
controlling Afghanistan for the purposes of providing themselves with a secure base to
launch future advances into Middle Eastern countries to spread Marxist-Leninist
Communism, not to foster the development of a more independent Afghanistan. The
Soviet Union rendered Afghan politics, culture, and society unimportant to their larger
goal to gain an upper hand in the Cold War. The United States government would follow
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a similar line of thinking and foreign policy in the following years during the AfghanSoviet War.
The Soviet coup of the Da’ud government regime was not welcomed by Afghan
nationalists or religious fundamentalists of the indigenous population in Afghanistan.
Soviet reforms in 1978 directly challenged the traditional socioeconomic and political
structure of Afghanistan. Land reform, credit reform, mandatory education, and
provisions centralizing government authority and altering the influence of religion on
Afghan politics prompted the formation of resistance groups across the country. Large
numbers of Afghans from various ethnic groups, particularly the Pashtuns and Tajiks,
formed into resistance groups that began openly combating PDPA reforms and Afghan
Army forces under the command of Soviet agents.
During this time, relations between the United States and Afghanistan were
“uncertain”. A report by the U.S. Department of State on December 1, 1978, stated the
United States was “unsure about the shape of things to come. Even assuring that the
present regime maintains its hold on power…we believe we should work from the
premise that a constructive U.S.-Afghan relationship could still emerge…The most
adverse development in terms of our interests would be the introduction of Soviet combat
troops within Afghanistan, which could seriously disturb the entire region.”21 The State
Department urged greater attention towards the situation in Afghanistan but it was not
until the actual invasion that it became a primary concern under the Carter administration.
The situation in Afghanistan demanded constant attention as well as a continued dialogue
with other states within the region, particularly Pakistan, in order to protect the nation’s
21
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geostrategic interests from possible threats. With the increased level of Soviet influence
within the country by 1978, the United States initially proceeded with caution in
supporting resistance forces, encouraging the embassies of nations such as Pakistan, and
in cities such as Tehran, and Islamabad to take the lead in creating a “network of
cooperative relations which will contribute to peace and stability” in Afghanistan.22
The United States was concerned with the promotion of Afghanistan’s
independence, its national identity, and its political and economic development in the
international system, but primarily in terms of making it a part of the U.S. sphere of
influence. The policy goals of the United States Embassy in Kabul in 1978 demonstrates
that the United States government wanted to diversify Afghanistan’s economic, political,
and military relationships with moderate countries of the Persian Gulf such as Iran and
Turkey. Furthermore, the United States wanted to foster a stronger and more confident
relationship with members of the Afghan elite not aligned with the PDPA, and leaders of
moderate resistance forces. The United States aimed to maintain an exchange of views
and ideas with Afghanistan through the government and private channels.23 Indeed, in
1978 the United States intended to “maintain a bilateral aid program for basic human
needs and that such a program is designed to keep open the avenues of communication
between the United States and Afghanistan.”24 However, despite these goals and policy
proposals, the United States government in 1978 was concerned primarily with the revolt
developing against the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Moreover, as indicated by a telegram
from the American Embassy in Tehran discussing a meeting with President Taraki, while
22
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the United States government proclaimed its investment in Afghanistan’s independence,
it was ready to “continue normal diplomatic relations” and have “close working relations
with the new government.”25 In 1978, the United States government put its interest in
preserving the Cold War détente with the Soviet Union above its interest in preserving
the independence and national identity of Afghanistan, despite the increasing
encroachment of the Soviet Union and the level of resistance against the Soviet regime in
Kabul.
In early 1979, the situation with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan changed
dramatically. At least twenty-four of the twenty-eight provinces in Afghanistan openly
revolted against the Soviet regime in Kabul. Anti-government activity spread rapidly,
particularly among Pashtuns. By the spring of 1979, resistance by Afghan rebels or the
Mujahadeen in Afghanistan’s cities, specifically Herat, intensified, and led many soldiers
in the Afghan army to disband and join the Mujahadeen. It was at this point that the
Soviet Politburo recognized that if the PDPA was to survive in Kabul the level of Soviet
involvement had to increase.26 Afghan politicians in the PDPA, and Soviet leaders in the
KGB, and more importantly the Politburo, debated over whether Soviet military
intervention in the region was necessary. While many leaders within the Politburo and
KGB advocated an increase in arms and military training to the Afghan army, limited
liberal reforms, and more educational reforms so as not to alienate and move the rest of
the Afghan population closer to the resistance, there were still some Soviet officials who
argued that the Afghan army was incapable of stopping the growing resistance and that
Soviet military intervention was necessary to protect the government regime in Kabul. In
25
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early 1979, the Soviet Politburo ultimately decided to have President Taraki enact
broader reforms and provide more effective military support to the Afghan army short of
direct intervention in Afghanistan. However, after a few months of heavy back and forth
fighting between the Mujahadeen and the Afghan army, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin
overthrew President Taraki in October of 1979. It was the coup orchestrated by Amin that
ultimately led to the Soviet Union decision to invade Afghanistan on December 24, 1979.
During 1979 prior to the Soviet invasion, the United States closely monitored the
situation in Afghanistan, the status of the Soviet regime in Kabul, and the Mujahadeen
resistance. Despite the intensity of the fighting between the Mujahadeen and the Afghan
army, and the major setbacks suffered by the Soviet regime in Kabul, the United States
government did not foresee an invasion by the Soviet Union. According to a cable from
the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union in May of 1979, the United States government was
under the impression that an invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was not likely
to occur because it would be problematic for its global Cold War interests and the détente
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. “The likely nature and scope of Soviet military
assistance in Afghanistan is to the Afghanistan military… All the information we have
been able to gather about this region indicates that Moscow has the situation well under
control…Should the discontent nonetheless surface, the Soviets can be counted on to
move quickly and effectively to crush it.”27 Furthermore, as demonstrated in a telegram
from the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan during the same time, the United States
government assessed that “the USSR will probably try to avoid plunging into what could
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well become a Vietnam-type scenario.”28 However, this is all not to say that U.S. officials
in Washington and Afghanistan did not contemplate the possible rationale that would
lead the Soviet Union to invade. In fact, the United States Embassy in Afghanistan did
consider the possibility of a Soviet invasion because under the pretext of the Cold War,
the Soviet government was not ready to allow a conservative Islamic nation to disrupt
Soviet influence in its central Asian republics. With the Afghan resistance movement
effectively challenging Soviet ideals, values, and military power, the U.S. Embassy in
Afghanistan believed that the Soviets realized this example could potentially lead to the
rise of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist movements in republics within the Soviet state
and in other nations under Soviet influence. The persistence of the Afghan resistance
movement represented an internal and external threat to the Soviet Union and the
legitimacy of its Communist- Marxist political and economic system in the Cold War.29
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a major shift in opinion among U.S.
officials towards the global intentions of the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion marked
an end to the Cold War détente and Afghanistan was now the battlefield between the U.S.
and Soviet Union for influence and authority in the Middle East.30 In his presidential
address to Congress on January 4, 1980, President Carter declared the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan as a serious act of aggression that threatened vital U.S. interests and the
security of the United States itself. The deployment of Soviet forces in Afghanistan,
according to President Carter, placed “the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the
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vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf, threatens a strategically located country, Pakistan,
poses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and other nations in the Middle
East, and above all shows that the Soviet will use force to take over a neighboring
country.”31 However, under President Carter, the U.S. response to the invasion was slow,
and minimal, and largely a mixture of symbolic gestures.32 President Carter enacted a
grain embargo, authorized a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, and rallied the UN to
condemn the invasion and help Afghan refugees. Furthermore, President Carter halted the
sale of high technology such as computers and oil-drilling equipment to the Soviet Union,
delayed the opening of a new Soviet consulate in New York, and curbed Soviet fishing
privileges in U.S. waters.33
By the spring of 1980, the presence of more than 100,000 Soviet troops in
Afghanistan propelled President Carter to pursue a policy to provide military aid to
Mujahadeen forces and actively engage the United States against the Soviet Union.34 In
the fall of 1980 President Carter authorized the CIA and a Rapid Deployment Force or
RDF, to orchestrate covert assistance to the Afghan Mujahadeen financed in part by
congressional appropriations. Although the level of U.S. commitment to the Afghan
cause was strong on paper, in actuality the amount of military aid appropriated by the
United States to the Afghan Mujahadeen totaled only $30 million in 1980.35 This was
hardly enough for the Mujahadeen to stage a successful war against the Soviet Union.
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Even though there it is unclear as to why the United States government under President
Carter was hesitant to provide more funding and military assistance to the Afghan
Mujahadeen, it is clear that the U.S. government was concerned most with its own
security and interests in Afghanistan and the Middle East in relation to the progress of the
Soviet Union, rather than Afghanistan’s independence. Some historians and scholars
believe the Carter administration hoped to “bleed” the Soviet Union militarily and
financially in Afghanistan, and was following a wait-and-see approach based on the
progress of the Soviet Union and the Mujahadeen. Indeed, the United States government
was ready to support whichever side prevailed in the conflict in order to protect its
interests in Afghanistan and the Middle East as part of the larger geostrategic strategy to
secure an upper hand in the Cold War.
In 1980, the United States government perceived the Soviet Union would
“achieve a rapid and decisive outcome” over the Mujahadeen and a “long-term
occupation remains a very real possibility.”36 In addition, the U.S. government
considered the fighting strength of the Mujahadeen to be unorganized, uncertain,
insubstantial, and weak compared to the power of Soviet military technology. According
to a report in 1980 by the CIA on the tribes in Southwest Asia that comprised the
Mujahadeen forces, “most are loosely organized with little or no central authority…The
Afghan insurgency has been strongest only among the most traditionally minded, such as
the Pashtun and Tajiks farther north…” Although,
a major problem of the Soviets was to convince the tribes that it is in their
advantage to support the government…The Soviets can bolster their support and
reforms with offers of weapons and money. They can also threaten retaliation
36
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against tribesman who will not cooperate, or threaten to support their traditional
enemies… Ethnic ties between groups in the USSR and in northern Afghanistan
can be exploited.37
However, a level of uncertainty as to the motivations of the Soviet Union still existed.38
Would the Soviet Union stop in Afghanistan or use Afghanistan as a springboard for
further Communist revolution in the Middle East thus risking a war with the U.S.? This
was the primary question and concern facing officials of the U.S. government. Many
leaned towards the latter but were unwilling to act on what was at the time an
assumption. Based upon the larger context of the Cold War, and U.S. perceptions of the
military capabilities, cohesion, and strength of the Mujahadeen in 1980, members of
Congress and political advisors to President Carter were not prepared to risk all out war
with the Soviet Union and the end of a possible future détente with the Soviet Union, if
they were to establish a stable government in Afghanistan, by providing noticeably large
amounts of monetary and military aid to Mujahadeen forces and openly helping
Afghanistan maintain its independence and national identity.
At the start of 1981, and at the very end of the Carter administration, the U.S.
State Department continued to follow a policy in which the United States would take “a
neutral line”. Under such a policy, there was little contact with the Soviet regime in
Kabul or the leaders of the Mujahadeen, and the situation in Afghanistan was monitored
closely. However, as fighting between the Mujahadeen intensified, leading to large losses
for the Afghan resistance and among the Afghan civilian populace, U.S. strategy
regarding the Soviet advance took a more firm line and signaled the end of the détente
with the Soviet Union for U.S. policymakers. Although U.S. National Security Decision
37
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Directive 63 focused on the security of the entire Persian Gulf, President Carter stated
that the Soviet Union assault on the vital interests of the United States in this region,
which included Afghanistan, “will be repelled by the use of any means necessary,
including military force.”39 In this directive, the administration specified the U.S.
government intended now to maintain a credible presence in Afghanistan, “developing a
broad range of military and related response options in and outside the region against the
Soviet Union.”40 As in 1980, U.S. options for influencing events in Afghanistan were
limited to providing direct or indirect assistance to the Afghan Mujahadeen forces and
refugees, and to support the regime of President Zia Ul-Haq of Pakistan, which had been
the primary source of military and economic aid to the Mujahadeen thus far. In both
cases, however, aid would flow through the government of Pakistan, specifically the ISI,
since they provided the only refuge for the Afghan insurgents to which the U.S. had
access.41
With the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the Reagan Administration made the
policy approach to the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan far more aggressive. By the end of
1981, all 29 provinces of Afghanistan were engaged in open war with the Soviet Union.
Rural Afghanistan became the battleground between Mujahadeen forces and Soviet
troops. While the Mujahadeen had firm control over the Afghan countryside, the Soviet
Union was in complete control of Afghan cities, government instillations, and airports.
With the situation in Afghanistan seemed to be moving away from a military deadlock
toward a Soviet victory, President Reagan began to use the CIA and State Department to
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assess the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Mujahadeen, and the level of
U.S. aid required to ensure a withdrawal of Soviet forces and defeat. In 1982 the United
States government under President Reagan began to plan foreign military policies and
strategies to effectively defeat the Soviet Union, and change the internal political
direction of Afghanistan towards U.S. values, ideals, and systems of government, not its
own independence. According to President Reagan and his political advisors such
aggressive action on the part of the United States was necessary to secure victory in the
Cold War, secure U.S. interests in the Middle East, and confirm his own conviction that
the principles, values, and ideas of the United States were the routes to modernity,
prosperity, and a better international system.42 In no part of the U.S. foreign policy
objectives or strategy in the 1980’s was a concern, for the political independence and
national identity of Afghanistan, and how U.S. influence in Afghanistan might clash and
backfire with the country’s Islamic and traditional roots, a problem that the Soviet Union
was encountering. The United States government was focusing on short-term rather than
long-term policy objectives and gains.43
Throughout 1982 up until the beginning of 1983, the Soviet Union had made great
military gains and advances in Afghanistan. In the three years since the invasion, the
Soviets had established military bases and control over the northern provinces and major
cities and valleys in Afghanistan, such as the Panjishir Valley, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and
Kabul. Soviet assaults during this time consisted of the movement of heavily armed
ground troops and elite Spetsnaz fighters, supported by T-55 tanks, Mi-24 Hind
helicopters, and MiG 21 fighter jets. The Soviet army that invaded Afghanistan was well
42
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equipped and prepared for a fast paced, mechanized war. The overwhelming firepower of
the Soviet forces and aircraft destroyed Afghan villages indiscriminately targeting and
bombing civilian populations. Although the Soviet Union made advances in Afghanistan
during this time, their assaults further invigorated the Afghan populace and refugee
population to join the resistance, and the international community to support its cause.
The key to this transition in the war and in United States foreign policy was a
focus on arming and equipping the Afghan Mujahadeen to cripple and defeat Soviet
forces. Up until 1983, particularly in 1982, the Reagan administration continued the
foreign policy framework established by President Carter. The U.S. National Security
Decision Directive 32 in May of 1982 demonstrates that the United States’ global
objectives were still within in the confines of the larger geostrategic engagement with the
Soviet Union in the Cold War. The security of the Southwest Asia, particularly
Afghanistan, was “inextricably linked” to the security of, U.S. interests, in terms of
maintaining its Cold War allies, and the U.S. itself.44 Indeed, the United States
government under this directive was to “deter military attack by the USSR and its allies
against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of the
conflict”, “to strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening
existing alliances”, “to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military
presence throughout the world,” and “to neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its
influence through the use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic action, propaganda,
and disinformation.”45 To achieve these foreign policy goals, the U.S. government
continued its programs of limited funding for weaponry and other supplies to the Afghan
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resistance through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The extent of U.S. relations with Pakistan,
particularly between the CIA and the ISI, at this time was based on their competition for
control over the situation in Afghanistan, and thus fragile, not extending beyond the
bounds of channeling funds and military equipment to the Mujahadeen.
In assessing only the military capabilities of the insurgency compared to Soviet
forces, the CIA Directorate of Research in October of 1982 stated that,
all six major resistance groups appear to have adequate supplies of modern assault
weapons and ammunition but still lack the heavier weaponry needed to turn the
military situation in their favor. Smaller groups in isolated provinces, however,
are still affected by shortages of small arms and ammunition…. Major military
equipment deficiencies among resistance forces include more and better surfaceto-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, antitank missiles,
antitank mines, man-pack mortars, and tactical radio equipment.46
Although some U.S. policymakers believed that the resistance forces could continue the
insurgency for the foreseeable future at its present level, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan
continued effective bombing raids from higher altitudes and use high performance
aircraft in order to provide sufficient escort protection.47 Furthermore, in 1982, the United
States government had mixed perceptions with regards to the sustainability of the
Mujahadeen against Soviet forces. Despite a level of uncertainty, U.S. officials did not
disregard the possibility of a Soviet defeat if the Mujahadeen were better equipped. In the
early 1980’s, the U.S. government did not assess in its foreign policy the political
capabilities and reliability of the Mujhahadeen and its leaders, and the future political
situation in Afghanistan if the Soviet were defeated. As with the Carter Administration,
the Reagan Administration focused on the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and
aid to the Mujahadeen through a monetary, military and Cold War lens.
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In 1983 a number of events propelled a more active American foreign policy and
involvement in Afghanistan. Under the U.S. National Security Decision Directive 75
outlining U.S. relations with the USSR, the Reagan administration made this point clear
stating that the U.S. would “contain and overtime reverse Soviet expansionism by
competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union…particularly in the
overall military balance in geographical regions of priority concern to the United
States.”48 In Afghanistan, “the U.S. objective is to keep pressure on Moscow for
withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets’ political, military, and other costs remain high
while the occupation continues…the U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations.”49
Moreover, relations with Pakistan, particularly between the CIA and ISI, and President
Reagan and President Zia Ul-Haq, were improving. The government in Washington was
becoming more cohesive and aligned in pushing for a policy to provide more assistance
in arming the Mujahadeen.50
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CHAPTER THREE
THE U.S. AND MUJAHADEEN TURN THE TIDE

The most intense fighting and covert action occurred in the Afghan-Soviet War
between 1984 and 1987. As the Soviet Union altered its political and military strategy in
Afghanistan, following more aggressive tactics and measures, the Reagan administration,
the CIA, the State Department, and Congress began to increase its level of monetary and
military aid to the Mujahadeen. Although this helped facilitate the Mujahadeen success
over Soviet forces in the second half of the 1980’s, United States policymakers continued
to set aside the growing internal unrest and conflict arising among Mujahadeen leaders
for U.S. interests, specifically with regards to defeating the Soviet Union in the larger
geostrategic competition that was the Cold War.
In 1984, the Soviet Union experienced a shift in its military leadership, which
resulted in more aggressive military tactics and a broadening of military objectives in
Afghanistan. In the period from the invasion in 1979 to 1983 the military had been under
the direction of Yuri Andropov, General Secretary to the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. Under Andropov, Soviet forces were limited to maintaining control over key
urban centers and passes to Pakistan, and destroying supply lines to the Mujahadeen from
Pakistan. This stance perplexed U.S. policymakers. At a hearing on Afghanistan by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in November of 1984, Alexander Alexiev, a
research analyst for the RAND Corporations stated,
the most striking and, at first glance, paradoxical feature of the Soviet military
effort at present is the increasing evidence that it may not be designed to secure a
43

purely military solution through a decisive defeat of resistance forces. This is very
likely due to the realization that such a military solution is not obtainable short of
a dramatic intensification of the Soviet effort entailing massive and perhaps
intolerable personnel loss and economic and political costs…The Soviet approach
has consisted of large-scale attempts to curtail food production and destroy the
economic base of support in general for the Mujahadeen in areas known to be
resistance strongholds.1
The Soviet Union used scorched-earth tactics such as napalm for the outright destruction
of land and irrigation systems, while establishing strong defenses around urban centers,
particularly Kabul.2
Soviet political warfare had been both internal and external. As demonstrated by
Alexander Alexiev, the Soviet strategy internally was aimed at winning over some
elements of the diverse Afghan society, exacerbating traditional ethnic and tribal
tensions, promoting separatism, and preventing the emergence of Afghan nationalism.
The Soviets established a Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities to pursue these goals and
also utilized the Afghan secret service or Khad. The Ministry pursued a dual approach in
Afghanistan. In the northern part of the country, primarily populated by the Uzbeck and
Tajik ethnic groups, the Soviet Union government stressed their separate identity and
close historical and cultural links to the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet government
in Moscow and Kabul promoted a “higher level of modernization and standard of living”
and promised, “the Afghan’s own future will be brighter under socialism and Soviet
rule.” The other side of the Soviet political approach to Afghanistan consisted of bribing
and co-opting tribal and religious elites in the southern part of Afghanistan and Pashtun
ethnic groups to support the Soviet government and withhold aid to the resistance.
Externally, the Soviet Union government in Moscow sought to divert international
1
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attention from the conflict in Afghanistan and more importantly intimidate Pakistan into
curtailing its support for the resistance.3
Although the Soviet Union did experience some success militarily and politically
up until mid to late 1984, from a U.S. perspective it was not clear to what extent these
tactics were effective in the long term. In late 1984, with resistance forces still holding
off the Soviet advance, the Politburo in Moscow appointed Konstantin Chernenko as
General Secretary and head of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan.4 Under his
command the Afghan resistance faced the biggest Soviet military challenge of the war.
Offensives by the Soviet Union from 1984 to 1988 involved 5,000 to 10,000 troops and
Spetznaz units, the indiscriminate carpet bombing of highly populated areas and border
regions, and high altitude TU-16 Badger jet bomber and Mi-24 and Mi-25 Hind attack
helicopter raids. The Soviet forces adopted “Vietnam-style search and destroy” tactics.5
The tactics were successful initially, particularly between 1984 and 1985. The Soviets
gained control over most of the Panjishir Valley, the Salang Road, and resistance
strongholds in Herat, and in the Logar Valley surrounding Kabul.6 However, the
resistance proved strong and prevented a complete overthrow of Afghanistan by Soviet
forces.
This phase of the Afghan-Soviet War witnessed the rise of a new generation of
unified fighters or “holy warriors” in Afghanistan known as the Mujahadeen. Although
Muslims have been waging war in the name of Islam among themselves and with
international powers since the nineteenth century, the Afghan-Soviet War witnessed a
3

Ibid, 4.
Diego Cordovez, and Selig S. Harrison. Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 147.
5 Ibid, 149-150.
6 Ibid, 150.
4

45

transformation and an expansion in the legitimacy and importance of the concept of jihad
and the Mujahadeen.
The term jihad literally means “struggle” and is frequently connected within the
Islamic faith with “striving in the way of God”. A person who engages in a jihad is
known as a Mujahid and the plural is Mujahadeen.7 Considered an important religious
duty for Muslims, originally the concept of jihad applied to defensive action rather than
the conquest of infidels. Over time, and with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
particular, this understanding has changed to include action against direct and indirect
forms of imperialism and colonialism. The jihad conducted by the Mujahadeen in
Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion led to the term’s association with revolt,
revolution, and offensive action known as a “holy war,” which crosses a spectrum of
political and religious principles within the Islamic faith and Muslim world.8 The Afghan
resistance against the Soviet Union under the banner of jihad, was the first case in which
the ideologies and politics embedded within the Islamic faith served as a point of
unification for success against an outside aggressor and non-Muslim force.9
In addition to this transition was also a change in the significance of the
Mujahadeen within the Islamic faith, the Muslim world, and the international system, as a
result of the Afghan-Soviet War. Over the course of the war against the Soviet Union, the
Mujahadeen in Afghanistan witnessed a major transformation from a small guerilla
fighting force to a large religious and political resistance movement that effectively
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challenged and defeated an international power in a technologically uneven war.10 The
victory over the Soviet Union in the 1980’s led to the rise of the Mujahadeen from a
regional stage to an area of international importance, specifically for the United States.
Beginning in 1978, the resistance raised substantial opposition to the Soviet
regime in Kabul, despite the Mujahadeen’s disunity and disorganization. Factors which
contributed to the formation of the Afghan resistance included the atheism of the Soviet
regime in Kabul, the destruction of their homes, the rapaciousness of Soviet soldiers, and
the development of a large refugee population in Pakistan.11 The Soviet pursuit of reform
and social revolution might have succeeded, argues Naby and Magnus, had the Soviet
regime respected the connection of the Islamic faith and customs to the social and
political infrastructure of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Soviet Union might have
experienced success had the Afghan military been more loyal to the Soviet cause, but
Afghan troops did not truly recognize the Afghani Communist politicians and agents as
legitimate leaders.12 The ranks of the Mujahadeen grew exponentially as members of the
Afghan army disbanded and joined the resistance upon the Soviet invasion and after the
Soviet assault began, attracting more Afghan citizens and refugees within Pakistan to its
cause. Ultimately, the Mujahadeen grew to include not just Pashtuns and Tajiks, but
Afghan peoples from all of its 29 provinces and multiple ethnic groups.
Nonetheless, the Mujahadeen, albeit large, was deeply fragmented, divided into
individual fighting groups with their own leaders. The primary Mujahadeen fighting
forces were led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Ahmed Shah
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Massoud.13 Although they led resistance groups formed under similar circumstances,
these leaders engaged in competition not only against the Soviet military but also, and
more importantly, among themselves for outside support, power, and control over
Afghanistan. The United States government recognized the ethnic and religious divisions
between factions and leaders of the Mujahadeen throughout the war, but chose to neglect
the social and political implications it would have in the post-war period so long as the
Mujahadeen used U.S. weapons to effectively challenge and defeat the Soviet Union.
In the first stage of the jihad, the Afghan Mujahadeen fighters were equipped with
Enfield rifles, rusting sabers, and were organized into village guerilla units. According to
U.S. analysts in 1984, the “most glaring deficiency” for the resistance was a,
lack of any effective means to combat Soviet jets and helicopters such as portable
heat-seeking missiles. The best weapon presently used against Soviet air, the ZPU
14.5 mm anti-aircraft gun in its single and double barrel configuration, is only
conditionally portable and is generally available only in the border regions. The
standard weapon used, the 12.7 mm DShK heavy machine gun, has a range of
only 1000 meters and is not very effective. As a result, the Soviets are able to
operate with virtual impunity in the air, which, given the fact that perhaps 80% of
all Soviet combat and logistic operations depend on air, virtually precludes any
significant and lasting Mujahadeen military gains.14
The Mujahadeen lacked not only heavy weaponry, but also essentials such as
ammunition, communication devices, mine detectors, range finders, binoculars, and
warm clothing for the winter season.15
By 1989 however, the fighters were equipped with the world’s most elite
weaponry.16 This was primarily due to the large increase in monetary and military aid by
the United States beginning in 1984 under President Reagan. This was matched by the
13
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kingdom in Saudi Arabia, and furthered by an influx of “captured” Soviet weaponry
supplied by Egypt. These weapons were channeled to the resistance groups by President
Zia- Ul Haq and the ISI in Pakistan and the CIA. Reagan’s policy marked a fundamental
shift in U.S. perception of the Mujahadeen, and a major change in the course of the
Soviet-Afghan War, and U.S. relations with Afghanistan up to the present day.
The war was a contest of endurance, perseverance, and will. The Mujahadeen
used the terrain and combined its guerilla tactics with the advanced military aid provided
by the United States to ultimately wear down Soviet morale, resilience, and the
effectiveness of their new military tactics. Although the military deficiencies, agricultural
decline, and shortages of food among Afghan citizens and members of the Mujahadeen
were of great concern and importance to the U.S. foreign policy agenda, the biggest
problem facing the Mujahadeen was in the political realm, particularly the lack of unity
among its political representatives. According to a report by Alexander Alexiev to
Congress and the Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the Afghan conflict,
“Many Mujahadeen field commanders and leaders of political factions at present
represent more of an obstacle to effective resistance than an asset. They also contribute to
the divisiveness inside Afghanistan by virtue of the fact that they continue to be the main
recipients and distributors of weapons and ammunition which gives them powerful
political leverage over the men in the field.”17
In addition, Alexiev analyzed U.S. perceptions and strategy in Afghanistan during
this time. For U.S. officials in the CIA, State Department, and National Security Council
in 1984 it appeared that there were “a number of ways in which the effectiveness of the
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resistance could be improved considerably through streamlining of the international aid
effort.”18 The “key” was a,
better understanding of the needs of the men fighting in the field, which should
lead to the correction of the shortages hampering the resistance…there is a need
to supply at least some of the aid directly to the Mujahadeen, which will help
decrease the opportunities for corruption of the present system and alleviate
politicization. Direct supplies to the resistance are increasingly feasible since
there have emerged on the inside of the country a number of strong and respected
military commanders who possess political authority and respect…19
However, the Reagan Administration was divided on the issue. Some officials and
advisors to President Reagan and members of Congress cautioned against aid, arguing it
meant more “visible” U.S. involvement than heretofore, exacerbating relations with the
Soviet Union and thus “make plausible deniability impossible”. Furthermore, U.S.
officials in the Reagan Administration and Congress argued that Pakistan would be
unwilling to escalate aid to the Mujahadeen due to a fear that a more effective resistance
would bring Soviet assaults to Pakistan’s interior.20 As evidenced by analyses of the
Mujahadeen for the U.S. government in 1984, policymakers were concerned with the
political divisions and corruption within the Mujahadeen leadership but were primarily
focused on how such problems would impact U.S. monetary and military aid to resistance
groups and their level of success in defeating Soviet forces. U.S. government officials did
not evaluate the long-term implications of such divisions and the consequences of such a
lack of unity and compromise between Mujahadeen groups and their leaders upon the
post-war political and social fabric of Afghanistan if they were to declare victory over the
Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration and officials of the government in Washington
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were assessing their foreign policy objectives and strategy in terms of what would secure
and enhance U.S. interests within the region and in the larger Cold War conflict with the
Soviet Union.
Despite the debate within Washington over the course of action in aiding the
Mujahadeen, the Reagan administration and Congress ultimately pursued more
aggressive monetary and military aid. In early 1984, Director William Casey of the CIA
tipped the balance in Washington, stating to President Reagan and Congress, “the Soviet
Union is tremendously overextended and they’re vulnerable. If America challenges the
Soviet Union at every turn and ultimately defeats them in one place, that will shatter the
mythology of Communism as the future, and it will start to unravel.”21 Although he
argued this as early as 1981 under President Carter, in the Reagan Administration such
words and conviction by the Director of the CIA had a greater level of significance and
importance.
In January of 1984, the Reagan Administration authorized Casey to develop a
more intensive strategy for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Director Casey led the
Afghan Task Force in increasing arm supplies, money, and the level of training to the
Mujahadeen. Under the CIA SOVMAT Project, members of the Afghan Task Force
primarily relied on supplying the Mujahadeen with Soviet equipment and weaponry
captured by other nations and former Soviet allies, particularly Egypt.22 The U.S. Defense
Department cooperated with the CIA SOVMAT Project to upgrade the captured Soviet
weapons including rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, and
grenades. In addition, the early months of 1984, the CIA and the ISI designed special
21
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training camps for Mujahadeen field commanders in the United States at Fort Pickett and
in Pakistan.23
These initial efforts by the CIA were accelerated from late 1984 to early 1985, as
Congressman Charles Wilson, Senator Paul Tsongas, and Congressman Clarence “Doc”
Long, made great strides in expanding the CIA Afghan Task Force initial budget for
foreign military aid and assistance to the Mujahadeen from $30 million to $120 million.
These particular members of Congress, who had jurisdiction over discretionary
congressional appropriations to the branches of the U.S. military, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and the CIA, accepted the fact that without more substantial U.S.
aid, the Mujahadeen would ultimately be overrun and the Soviet Union would be
successful in launching further campaigns for Communist expansion in the Middle East
from Afghanistan. Furthermore, Wilson, Tsongas, and Long believed that the Reagan
Administration was more willing than former President Carter to accept and support such
budget increases in order to defeat the Soviet Union. Like CIA Director William Casey,
Congressmen Charles Wilson and “Doc” Long, and Senator Paul Tsongas, many, but not
all, of the officials in the CIA, the State Department, the National Security Council, as
well as in Congress, were motivated by a Cold War mentality of anti-Communist and
anti-Soviet sentiment. They desired to “get even” with the Soviet Union and Communists
for the American losses during the Vietnam War.24 They were concerned in helping
Afghanistan gain political independence from the Soviet Union, but not outright
independence from U.S. influence. As demonstrated above, although U.S. policymakers
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in the CIA and Congress were aware of the risks of supplying the resistance, they
continued to focus strictly on arming and using the Mujahadeen rather than U.S. troops to
deal a defeat to the Soviet Union in the Cold War and prove that Communism was a
threat to individual freedom and welfare, and modernity. However, U.S. government
officials were careful not to have their foreign aid to the Mujahadeen traceable back to
the United States.
The actions of Casey, Wilson, Long, and Tsongas paved the way for further
increases in monetary and military aid to the Mujahadeen by other Congressional
committees, such as the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, and the Senate and House Defense Subcommittee of Appropriations, headed
by Congressmen mentioned above and other members of Congress.25 With such
increased support for aiding the Mujahadeen in Congress, President Reagan signed
National Security Decision Directive 166 or “Expanded Aid to Afghan Guerrillas” in
March of 1985, authorizing efforts to drive Soviet forces out of Afghanistan “by all
means available.”26
Although this new policy followed an increase in funding by Congress to provide
the Afghan Mujahadeen with U.S. military technology and money, the National Security
Council and its Planning and Coordination Group or PCG, rather than the CIA, was given
more authority in the distribution of aid to Mujahadeen leaders.27 However, the CIA
under Director Casey persisted in involving itself with the supply and training of
Mujahadeen forces. By mid-1985, the total amount of U.S. monetary and military aid
25

Ibid, 156-157.
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York, Penguin Books, 2004), 126-127.
27 Ibid, 126-127.
26

53

provided to the Mujahadeen amounted to $250 million, matched by Saudi Arabia. The
appropriations were primarily used for the purchase of more advanced military weaponry,
such as the Swiss Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannon and British Blowpipe missiles, in order to
limit the effectiveness of Soviet air strikes and helicopter assaults.28
The United States continued to channel its monetary and military funding
primarily to the Mujahadeen through President Zia Ul-Haq and the ISI in Pakistan.
However, the government in Pakistan had its own political agenda with regards to aiding
Afghanistan and the Mujahadeen during the war that countered American interests and
objectives. With Soviet military offensives increasing in Afghanistan in 1984, President
Zia cooperated with the United States to not only remove the threat posed by the Soviet
Union but also to bring about a “strategic realignment” of South Asia under the
leadership of Pakistan.29
Brigadier Mohammed Yousef, Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammed Khan, and
General Akhtar Abdur Rahman of the ISI equipped, trained, and allocated monetary aid
from the Pakistani government and U.S. government to Mujahadeen groups. In doing so,
they aimed to assert stronger control over the resistance and its movements in
Afghanistan against Soviet troops. Compared to the U.S. strategy to aid a variety of
fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist local commanders of the Mujahadeen, the ISI
channeled the bulk of the United States and Pakistan’s military and monetary aid to
leaders of the most fundamentalist factions of the resistance. This included the
distribution of weapons and money to Hezbe Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Jamaat-e-
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Islami, and most importantly, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar.30 They chose this strategy because
leaders such as Hekmatyar were the most popular among the refugee population in
Pakistan and were considered by the ISI to be the most effective and determined units of
the Mujahadeen. In addition, the ISI and Pakistani government respected the significant
ties Gulbaddin Hekmatyar had to Pashtuns within their country.31
Hekmatyar was the most radical Islamic fundamentalist among the Mujahadeen
during the Afghan-Soviet War. A member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and founder of
the Hezb-e Islami political party, Hekmatyar was a fervent Islamic extremist who had
alliances with various radical members of the Mujahadeen. Although he was well
connected with other members of the Mujahadeen, he was not willing to compromise and
unify with other field commanders and leaders within the resistance. Despite their
common enemy, the Soviet Union, Hekmatyar was known for fighting with and at times
killing leaders of rival factions within the Mujahadeen forces during the war in order to
improve his status in the country in the post-war period. Even though his actions were
criticized by the CIA, the National Security Council, and the State Department, the ISI
provided him with the strongest support and allocated the highest percentage of its covert
aid to him during the war. The leaders of the ISI argued that he was reliable and had a
history of success in organizing military assaults against Soviet forces.32
The ISI’s distribution of money and weapons from the U.S., Egypt and Pakistan
to fundamentalist leaders and, more importantly, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, during the war
contributed greatly to the pervasive corruption, political unrest, and civil war that marked
30
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Afghanistan in the post-war years. According to Cordovez and Harrison, the United
States government “did not make a serious effort to prevent the consolidation of
fundamentalist control over the resistance” under the direction of the ISI.33 For the larger
Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, Pakistan was a major
U.S. ally in the Middle East and was a “frontline state” in the Cold War and AfghanSoviet War. The United States allowed the ISI to continue aiding Hekmatyar and other
fundamentalist leaders as long as it was effective in combating Soviet troops and
contributing to the defeat of the Soviet military in Afghanistan, further strengthen U.S.
relations with Pakistan, and would, in the end, secure U.S. Cold War interests and
influence in Afghanistan. However, this is not to say that the CIA did not recognize, in its
entirety, the threat of ISI activity and aid to Hekmatyar to Afghanistan’s future and U.S.
interests in the region because of his extreme fundamentalism.
In 1985, as a result of their concerns about Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and the future
of Afghanistan, the CIA began to limit their dependency on the ISI and take more
unilateral action by providing their own military assistance to preferred leaders of the
Mujahadeen, such as Ahmed Shah Massoud. Furthermore, the CIA Afghan Task Force
began to utilize Afghan agents within Kabul, such as Abdul Haq, and members of the
Pashtun Durrani tribal federation, all of whom opposed the ISI and Gulbaddin
Hekmatyar, to increase their involvement in the war and open new outlets for aid to the
Mujahadeen. Despite former President Ford’s Executive Order 11905 restricting
intelligence activities and political assassination, the CIA in late 1985 also began to
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organize covert operations to attempt to assassinate Mohammed Najibullah, the fourth
and last President of the Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.34
Although the CIA had provided Massoud’s resistance forces, the United Front of
the Council of the North, with weapons and funding in the years prior to 1985, it was in
1985 that aid to his Afghan fighters in the Panjishir Valley markedly increased relative to
other leaders of the Mujahadeen that the U.S. government was supporting. The U.S.
considered Massoud to be a major strategist and fighter in the Panjishir Valley during the
war.35 Despite a temporary truce with the Soviet Union in 1983, Massoud was well
respected among many leaders and volunteers of the Mujahadeen. From a U.S.
perspective, the truce provided Massoud with a period of time in which he was able to
regroup and rearm his forces in the valley, and challenge Hekmatyar on a regional level
for power. Indeed, in 1984 and throughout 1985, Massoud and his forces countered a
20,000 man Soviet advance into the Panjishir Valley.36 Moreover, and more importantly,
the CIA and the State Department valued the fact that Massoud, although devout, was not
an extremist like Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. As a result, the CIA contended that arming him
over others posed less of a threat to U.S. interests in the region.
Although there was immense competition for power and aid between Ahmed
Shah Massoud and extreme Islamic fundamentalist leaders of the Mujahadeen,
particularly Rabbani and Hekmatyar, the CIA neglected to properly address the threat
posed by Hekmatyar and the possible consequences of aligning themselves and the U.S.
with Massoud. The CIA continued to provide the most monetary and military aid to the
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Mujahadeen and Massoud, and conduct covert operations in Afghanistan, despite NSDD166 limitations on their authority in the Afghan-Soviet War. Under the context of the
Cold War, the CIA perceived Massoud as the most capable ally and source of U.S.
military and monetary aid for the defeat of the Soviets, protection of U.S. interests during
the war, and spread of U.S. political influence in the post-war period.
In January of 1985, Soviet elite Septznaz units and the Soviet Fourth Army, were
continuing their new military strategy and tactics in attempt to break the stalemate with
the Mujahadeen. Air missions and helicopter raids continued along with increases in
troop numbers to a total of 115,000 men in Afghanistan. An additional 40,000 men on the
Soviet side of the Afghan border and between 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers of the Afghan
army backed these forces.37 According to U.S. analysts in the U.S. Foreign Affairs and
National Defense Division, the war was estimated to cost the Soviet Union $3 billion per
year and 25,000 combat related casualties. Notwithstanding such costs, the Soviet
military in 1985 still remained strong and continued to make clear advances in
Afghanistan. According to Richard P. Cronin, a U.S. analyst for the U.S. Foreign Affairs
and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, the Soviet Union
has “kept a communist regime in power in a sensitive border region and has gained some
strategic advantages, including an expanded airbase at Shindand, in Southwestern
Afghanistan, which puts Soviet tactical aircraft nominally within range of the Persian
Gulf.”38 Furthermore, “Soviet strategy seems to be maintaining control of Afghanistan
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with a minimum military commitment while seeking to train a new generation of Afghan
communist leaders loyal to Moscow.”39
Even though there was a level of uncertainty as to the sustainability of the
strength of the Soviet government regime and military in Afghanistan, the United States
was aware of the capacity of the Soviet military to continue its efforts in Afghanistan in
1985. However, Cronin perceived that the Soviet government regime to continue to “lack
popular support and remain divided between the dominant pro-Soviet Parcham
(“banner”) faction and a more radical Khalqi (“masses”) faction. The Afghan military
and bureaucracy (under the Soviet regime in Kabul) have been demoralized and
decimated by defections to the resistance and the flight of officials and soldiers to
Pakistan.”40
In contrast to the Soviet Union’s status in Afghanistan, U.S. relations with the
Mujahadeen in January of 1985 remained strong thanks to the increases in weaponry and
funding and the covert assistance provided by the CIA. Although U.S. aid to the Afghan
resistance was primarily a covert action by the U.S. government that did not bar the U.S.
news media from depicting the level of U.S. commitment to the resistance. According to
a Washington Post article, Congress had not only increased covert funding to the
Mujahadeen in the last two years to a range between $250-280 million, reportedly 80%
of the CIA covert operations budget, but it had also approved of a decision to supply the
resistance with a new anti-aircraft weapon.41
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In addition, despite division within the U.S. government over how much and for
how long aid to the resistance will continue, the government, according to the
Washington Post in 1985, planned to continue the Afghan Task Force program. The U.S.
perceived the Mujahadeen to be making great strides and advances militarily with U.S.
assistance but according to analysts in the U.S. Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Division, the resistance “still lack a common political platform and remain divided by
ideological, sectarian, and tribal differences and personal rivalries.”42 Despite the alliance
known as the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahadeen, formed between fundamentalist
and non-fundamentalist Mujahadeen leaders and parties such as Ahmed Shah Massoud,
Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami party, and Burhanuddin Rabbani and his
Jami’at-e-Islmani party, division and conflict between Massoud, Hekmatyar, and Rabbani
persisted. However, as Cronin noted, for the majority of U.S. government officials, the
fact that the Mujahadeen has “continued to fight for five years to prevent a Soviet
consolidation is reason enough to provide them with the wherewithal to fight more
effectively.”43
The United States government concerned itself with the lack of unity and conflict
between the leaders of the Mujahadeen mentioned above only when it was affecting the
military performance of the resistance against Soviet forces. However, for the majority of
the war, U.S. officials chose to ignore the possible implications of the conflict between
the future leaders of Afghanistan. This is evidenced as the U.S. continued to fund and
arm the Mujahadeen and its leaders despite warnings and declarations by the United
Nations General Assembly that the foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan threatens
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Afghan people’s rights to “determine their own form of government and to choose their
own economic, political, and social system free from outside intervention.”44
Furthermore, the U.N. General Assembly, while stressing humanitarian assistance to
Afghan refugees, cautioned against foreign intervention as it challenged the
“preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned character” in Afghanistan and the consequences of this threatened international
peace and security.45
In 1985, the consequences of such negligence on the part of U.S. officials began
to arise, particularly with the increase and spread of international terrorism. Influenced by
Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, extreme Islamic fundamentalists within the Muslim Brotherhood
and in Hezbollah, attempted to encourage support for the Arab cause in Palestine against
Israel and in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union by orchestrating terrorist attacks
across the world in areas such as Vienna, Italy, and Rome. Indeed, many of the terrorists
arising during this period were trained and funded as part of the Afghan Mujahadeen
supported by the ISI and Brigadier Yousef. Furthermore, the terrorist cells arising were
also aided by the money, and military training and technology provided by the U.S.
government under NSDD-166.46 Although the U.S. government, particularly the CIA and
National Security Council, was aware of this, under NSDD-166 members of the CIA and
National Security Council continued to train fighters and leaders of Mujahadeen forces to
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use weapons and explosives in the form of car bombs and briefcase bombs in order to
defeat Soviet military forces moving across Afghanistan.47
In response to this increase in international terrorism, President Reagan signed
National Security Decision Directive 179 in July of 1985 stating, “The United States has
an obligation to protect its citizens and interests against terrorists who have so little
regard for human life and values we cherish. It is therefore imperative that the United
States develop a sustained program for combating terrorism.”48 Yet, although the Reagan
Administration recognized this growing threat, its impact on Afghanistan during and after
the war was underestimated and not a primary concern and objective under U.S. foreign
policy during the 1980’s. Blinded by their pursuit to secure victory over the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan and in the Cold War, the United States government continued to train and
aid Mujahadeen leaders and fighters themselves and through the ISI.
The rise of terrorism in the mid to late 1980’s was as a result of the political
divisions within the Mujahadeen and of significant increases in U.S. aid to the resistance.
Yet Mujahadeen leaders were still gaining the support of the Afghan people and the
international community. In comparison to the Mujahadeen, the situation in Afghanistan
for Soviet forces was marked by long periods of stalemate and slow progress.
Furthermore, the new Soviet General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the Politburo
pursued a change in its political strategy within Afghanistan. The PDPA, under the
leadership of Babrak Karmal, was pushed by the Politburo, particularly Mikhail
Gorbachev, to adopt more liberal policies in Afghanistan and to transform the regime
from one dominated by Soviet Communist officials to one in which non-Communists
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were given influence and power. However, as the war progressed, Karmal resisted the
demands of the Soviet government in Moscow and the idea of a U.N. negotiated
settlement.49 The Soviet Politburo replaced him with Mohammad Najibullah.
In 1986 the most intense fighting of the Afghan-Soviet War occurred and Afghan
rebel divisions began to effectively challenge and reverse the success of the Soviet
military. Despite rumors of a possible Soviet strategy for withdrawal in Afghanistan, the
U.S. government, specifically the Office of the Secretary of Defense, contended that the
Soviet approach was “hard and intense on the battlefield, soft-sounding in the diplomatic
arena”.50 The U.S. government, particularly the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Congressional Afghan Task Force, believed that the Soviet Union, although
experiencing setbacks, was “as determined as ever to destroy and subjugate the
resistance” while deceiving and dividing the resistance and the international community
with false promises of a negotiated settlement and withdrawal from the region.51
Gorbachev initially pursued a U.N. negotiated settlement with the United States and
Pakistan; however, the Politburo insisted that the war could be won. The Soviet military
continued to add more elite Spetznaz units and increased their air bombardment of
Afghanistan, particularly sites of Mujahadeen operations.52 Mujahadeen resistance
activity intensified in all northern provinces of Afghanistan bordering the Soviet Union.
The United States government did not consider a U.N. negotiated settlement to be
a viable option as long as Soviet military forces were in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Reagan
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administration would have only agreed to a negotiated settlement for the regional conflict
in Afghanistan if the Soviet government guaranteed a withdrawal of its military.
Although a negotiated settlement could have ended the Afghan-Soviet War and signified
a major setback for the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the United States government,
despite the consequences, wanted to arm the Mujahadeen until the Soviet Union was
militarily and economically crippled before agreeing to a negotiated settlement to the
conflict. U.S. policymakers were fixed on securing U.S. hegemony in Afghanistan and
the Middle East through a Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. As a result of the continued
presence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan, the United States government considered
supplying Pakistan with a particularly important set of military hardware: Stinger antiaircraft cannons and Sidewinder missiles.
The decision to arm the Mujahadeen with the Stinger was hotly disputed in
Washington. The Stinger is a lightweight, easily portable, shoulder-fired air defense
system capable of destroying low-altitude high-performance aircraft. As a lightweight yet
durable weapon, it performs well in rugged and difficult terrain like that found
throughout Afghanistan.53 The U.S. Army was reluctant to deplete its stocks of one its
most valued weapons and feared that American military technology, if captured by Soviet
forces, would be compromised and deny the United States “plausible deniability”. The
State Department was concerned that the introduction of Stingers would provoke the
Soviet military to assault Pakistan.54 The CIA was wary of giving its full support to
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supplying the Afghan rebels with Stinger Missiles because of a fear that missiles could be
captured and used by terrorists rising within the ranks of the Mujahadeen.55
In addition, members of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan began to
debate over the establishment of a more legitimate political alliance of the Mujahadeen in
order to represent the resistance on an international stage. Task Force members such as
Congressman Charles Wilson, Senator Humphrey, Senator Wallop, and Ambassador
Kirkpatrick, believed the creation of a political headquarters for the Mujahadeen alliance
would facilitate not only greater political unity and stability in the post-war period, but
also, and more importantly greater humanitarian aid, unity among fundamentalist and
non-fundamentalist leaders in the Mujahadeen, and more reliable distribution of U.S.
military aid to members and leaders of the resistance.56 As evidenced by the statements
made by Senator Wallop on this issue, there was a concern that “what we are seeing isn’t
a change in policy but an absence of policy. We have yet to decide what to do, and
therefore we do a little bit of everything in the hopes that in some moment in time we will
see an emerging event which we can live with—and the best we could expect would be
something that we could live with…it wouldn’t be something that we created, it would be
something that we ultimately absorbed…there is not now a policy…it’s a vacuum.”57
Although the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan considered the short term
and long terms implications of the political instability of the resistance, these concerns
were subverted and undermined by the CIA, the National Security Council, the State
Department, and President Reagan. These particular branches of the U.S. government,
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although dependent on congressional appropriations to fund and arm the Mujahadeen,
were focused solely on arming the resistance until the Soviet Union was defeated and
committed to a negotiated settlement for withdrawal of its military forces under U.S.
pretences.
By mid-1987, the CIA station chief of Afghanistan, Milton Bearden, and
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle convinced President Reagan to authorize
the deployment of 250 Stingers and 1,000 missiles to Pakistan and the Mujahadeen.58
The Stingers did lead to massive losses for the Soviet Union militarily and economically
in 1986. Soviet air superiority was crippled as their fighter jets and assault helicopters
were shot down in large numbers.59 Though their effectiveness may have been overstated,
the Stinger was very successful in limiting the Soviet military and securing Mujahadeen
supply lines. Furthermore, the increased activity and success of the resistance with more
advanced military technology such as the Stinger missile demoralized Soviet troops. The
“hit-and-run ambush tactics” of the Mujahadeen forced Soviet troops to exercise
increased vigilance and expect the unexpected. In addition, the rugged terrains continued
to create numerous difficulties for the mechanized warfare Soviet forces were
accustomed to. The new phase of the Afghan-Soviet War entailed warfare that the Soviet
Armed Forces were not trained and prepared for.60
Although the U.S. government and military considered the implications for
providing the Mujahadeen with Stingers, the overall mission and policy goal to declare
victory over the Soviet Union in the conflict and in the Cold War overcame any
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consideration of the collateral consequences of this action. It can be concluded that the
Stingers made it much more difficult for the United States to move toward
disengagement from the region and from the war against the Soviet Union.61 Despite the
impact of the Stingers upon Soviet air power, and the fact that it probably hastened the
eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it can be considered that their introduction
to Mujahadeen forces threatened U.S. interests and security in the post-war period. This
is primarily evidenced as Islamic extremist groups and leaders such as Gulbaddin
Hekmatyar and members of the Hezb-e Islami party, and Burhanuddin Rabbani and
members of the Jami’at-e-Islmani party acquired this new military technology from the
ISI and intensified their campaign for power within Afghanistan while condemning U.S.
influence in the region after the Soviet withdrawal.62 But, for U.S. policymakers, the
supply of Stingers to the Mujahadeen served U.S. interests at the time of their
deployment, which was to defeat the Soviet Union, halt the spread of Communism, and
secure U.S. victory in the Cold War.
By 1987, it was clear to Gorbachev and his political advisors that the Soviet
Union could not continue their military efforts in Afghanistan. At this point in the war the
Mujahadeen were better organized and experiencing more military success. In addition,
American willingness to support and aid the Mujahadeen until victory was assured was
another factor influencing Gorbachev and his political advisors to reconsider their
strategy in Afghanistan. However, the most important element impacting Gorbachev’s
reevaluation of Soviet strategy and policy in Afghanistan was the effect the war was
having on the Soviet Union’s international position, and its political, economic, and
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social infrastructure. According to the CIA, on an international level, the Soviet-Afghan
War, according to Gorbachev, was a “bleeding wound”. The Soviet Union’s involvement
in the war led to periodic censure within the United Nations, and has become a
“stumblingblock for improved Sino-Soviet relations, and complicated Soviet policy
toward nations in the nonaligned movement.”63 Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s
continued engagement in the war by 1987 diminished the legitimacy of Soviet
Communism relative to U.S. democracy. Indeed, the idea of “Soviet exceptionalism” was
in question across the international system.
As an increase in Soviet casualties resulted from more aggressive Soviet military
action in the war, antiwar sentiment among the Soviet populace in Moscow grew. In
January of 1987 a government-sponsored opinion poll revealed that one out of six people
in Moscow openly criticized the war.64 The costs of the war helped divide public opinion
and the Politburo in Moscow. From 1979 to 1986 the number of Soviet troops within
Afghanistan increased from 80,000 to 120,000. Furthermore, from 1980 to 1985, Soviet
aircraft and military hardware was upgraded but at a considerable cost.65 These placed a
strain on the Soviet Union’s economic and political infrastructure. According to the U.S.
government, by 1987 the war had cost the Soviet Union 15 billion rubles. During 1984 to
1985 the Soviet military lost 750 aircraft, particularly helicopters. Although some of the
aircraft was replaced by existing stock, many of the more advanced and expensive
aircraft were remanufactured. Moreover, with the need for increases in the number of
troops within Afghanistan, the Soviet military was forced to spend more money on the
63

CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “The Cost of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” 1987, 1, National
Security Archive-Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War.
64 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, 247.
65 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “The Cost of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” 1987, 7-9, National
Security Archive- Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War.

68

production of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and personnel carriers.66 Although less
than three percent of the Soviet Union’s armed forces were engaged in the war in
Afghanistan by 1987, the economic costs of the war were becoming staggering.
As a result, the U.S. government perceived that under Gorbachev, the level of
Soviet military expenditures would level off and would not continue to grow. Despite the
increasing number of Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan to support Soviet special forces,
the United States government expected the Soviets “to continue to limit the resources
they are committing to ground operations” as they pursued political and military
strategies for disengagement and placing responsibility on the Afghan army to deal with
the resistance. However, the U.S. government did not believe that the Soviet Union was
prepared to abandon its government regime in Kabul.67 According to U.S. policymakers,
the USSR’s determination to sustain the rise in economic costs in the war until this point
in the war is evidence that they were committed to do whatever was necessary to secure
its government regime from the resistance. As a result, U.S. officials in the CIA, State
Department, and Congress were not prepared to relinquish their control over the
Mujahadeen and the situation in Afghanistan. The U.S. government was beginning to
experience a broadening of their objectives in Afghanistan. Despite a withdrawal of
Soviet military forces from the region, the U.S. government believed that Soviet
influence would remain in Afghanistan with the continued existence of the PDPA in
Kabul. In the context of the Cold War, it was no longer enough to secure a military and
economic defeat for the Soviet Union; U.S. policymakers were becoming more
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concerned with the political future of Afghanistan and establishing a political system that
would reflect American political and economic values and principles.
In recognition of this, Gorbachev continued to emphasize the need for a
government coalition that was not only attractive to Communist factions within
Afghanistan, but members of the resistance and tribal and ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
Gorbachev affirmed that the PDPA, under the leadership of Mohammad Najibullah,
needed to prepare to relinquish half of its power to nonparty and resistance elements, and
tribal and ethnic group leaders. However, the PDPA would remain in control of the
interior, defense, and foreign affairs in Afghanistan. Najibullah’s policy of “national
reconciliation” appealed to some members of the PDPA and Politburo, but did not gain
the approval of political hard liners within the PDPA and local and tribal ethnic leaders in
Afghanistan.68
Moscow’s internal conflict over the leadership and direction of the Kabul
government regime was influenced and further complicated by the United States and
Pakistan’s policy of continued aid to the Afghan resistance. The United States was
confident that increased pressure from a well-supplied and equipped resistance would
accomplish a Soviet troop withdrawal and ultimately displace the Najibullah regime in
Kabul in the post-war period. Yet, the United States government, in contrast to Pakistan,
did not want the future of Afghanistan to be controlled by Islamic fundamentalist
leaders.69 Although this may have been a secondary concern for U.S. policymakers
earlier in the war, in late 1987 as the Soviet resistance was on the brink of victory, it was
elevated in the U.S. foreign policy agenda in Afghanistan. Indeed, in late 1987, the
68
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United States government was beginning to shift its attention and policies towards the
reconstruction of Afghanistan’s political system and the future of its leadership.
However, a fundamental part of this transition in U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan
consisted of the United States government’s pursuit of negotiating a peace with the
Soviet Union to ensure the establishment of its own influence and control politically
within Afghanistan in the post-war period. The United States, anticipated a direct role in
the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. The
Mujahadeen, recognizing this, began to condemn that peace process which they had
sacrificed themselves for and now were not a part of. In July of 1987, the Mujahadeen
organized a council meeting at Ghor, in which 1,200 Mujahadeen commanders called for
the “political and tactical unity of all Mujahadeen fighting groups.”70 In addition, they
asserted, “that the right to self-determination belonged to the Mujahadeen, and to those
Afghans who are prepared to die in defense of their country.”71 The Mujahadeen was
preparing for victory and the future political, social, and economic reconstruction of
Afghanistan. In their preparation however, was no mention of the United States.
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CHAPTER FOUR
VICTORY WITHOUT PEACE: THE U.S. AND MUJAHADEEN BREAKDOWN
OF THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN
Between 1986 and 1988, diplomats from Pakistan, the United States and the
Soviet Union engaged in talks in Geneva, Switzerland for a negotiated settlement of the
political and military situation in Afghanistan. Despite a unilateral ceasefire in 1987, the
war continued and intensified during the Geneva meetings. As a result of the economic
and political situation in the Soviet Union, by the end of 1987, it was clear that Soviet
military forces could not continue the war effort in Afghanistan. Yet, the United States
government continued to heavily arm the Mujahadeen and pursued not just the
withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region, but also a major defeat of the Soviet Union
in the Cold War. Despite negotiations for the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
and recognition of a rising civil war between Mujahadeen leaders, U.S. policymakers
ignored the implications of providing monetary and military aid to the Mujahadeen, so
long as it ensured a U.S. victory in the Cold War and the opportunity, not necessarily
guarantee, for continued U.S. influence in Afghanistan in the post-war period.
In March of 1988, the CIA believed that Moscow had made a firm decision to
abandon Afghanistan as a result of the war’s effect on the Soviet regime’s ability to
follow through with its political agenda and goals in Afghanistan. In addition, U.S.
intelligence assessed that there was growing pessimism politically and socially in
Moscow about the military and political prospects for creating a viable client regime in
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Afghanistan. However, the Soviet government in Moscow aimed to maintain the
existence of the Soviet backed political regime under Najibullah in Kabul.1
The CIA did not believe that Moscow would attempt to partition Afghanistan or
start withdrawal and then renege.2 According to a special national intelligence estimate
by the CIA in March of 1988,
The Soviets want to withdraw under the cover of the Geneva accords. We
believe they would prefer to withdraw without an agreement, however,
rather than sign one that formally restricts their right to provide aid and
further undermines the legitimacy of the Kabul regime.3
The CIA focused on two possible scenarios with regards to the future of
Afghanistan’s political framework. One considered that the fighting for power among the
resistance groups would create so much chaos that no stable government would control
Afghanistan after the Communist regime collapsed and withdrew. The other scenario
focused on the possibility that Soviet regime would survive long after the Soviet’s
military’s withdrawal from the region.4
However, many U.S. government officials and advisors under President Reagan
argued that the Najibullah regime in Kabul would not long survive the completion of
Soviet withdrawal even with continued Soviet military assistance. An assessment of the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by the director of the CIA stated, “Despite
infighting, we believe the resistance will retain sufficient supplies and military strength to
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ensure the demise of the Communist government.”5 Yet, the United States government,
particularly the CIA, could not predict the composition of the new government that would
take its place in Kabul. U.S. policymakers believed “it initially will be an unstable
coalition of traditionalist and fundamentalist groups whose writ will not extend far
beyond Kabul and the leaders’ home area. It will be Islamic-possibly strongly
fundamentalist...”6 With regards to the new coalition’s relations with the U.S. once the
war concluded, the U.S. government perceived that it would be “ambivalent and at worst
actively hostile…”7 The CIA was becoming aware of the conflict between leaders of the
Mujahadeen and the possible implications it would have on U.S.-Afghan relations in the
post-war period. Yet, instead of addressing this problem and the consequences it could
have on U.S. security, and interests and influence in the region, the CIA continued to
focus on arming the Mujahadeen to ensure a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and
the demise of the Najibullah regime in Kabul.
Gorbachev and the Politburo hoped to neutralize U.S. aid to the resistance once
the Soviet military withdrawal began and use President Reagan and Washington’s
alliance with Pakistan to moderate the support for pro-Islamic fundamentalists provided
by Pakistani President Zia Ul-Haq. The United States government proved more willing to
limit the pro-Islamist fervor of Pakistan than to limit its own influence and aid to the
Mujahadeen.
The U.S. government also evaluated the international consequences of the Soviet
military’s defeat in Afghanistan in the context of the Cold War. According to U.S.
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officials in the CIA, “It is an implicit admission that Soviet-supported revolutions can be
reversed. It will demonstrate that there are limits on Moscow’s willingness and ability to
use its power abroad, tarnish its prestige among some elements of the Communist
movement, and lead other beleaguered Soviet clients to question Soviet resolve.”8 In
addition, withdrawal was perceived by the U.S. as a benefit for the Soviet Union and for
the West as well. It created an image of the Soviet Union as a responsible power in the
international system and improved Soviet diplomatic status in the U.N. and with the
United States. U.S. policymakers contended the withdrawal would present difficulties but
also opportunities for improved relations and influence in the Middle East, particularly
with Pakistan and Afghanistan. As evidenced by the statements above, the CIA viewed
the international consequences of a Soviet withdrawal in terms of its effect on the Cold
War, not in how it could impact U.S. security, the security of the international system,
and U.S. influence in Afghanistan’s social, political and economic reconstruction. The
CIA, although aware of the destabilizing situation in Afghanistan, failed to devote
enough consideration and attention to the fact that with the removal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, the well-armed Mujahadeen commanders and leaders would focus their
efforts and weaponry on competing and assaulting each other for power over the country.
On April 14, 1988, the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan and the
government of Pakistan, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving as
guarantors thereof, signed the Geneva Accords relating to the situation in Afghanistan.
The Geneva Accords consisted of an agreement for mutual relations, non-interference
and non-intervention, and the return of Afghan refugees, to Afghanistan. In addition, and
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most importantly, the Geneva Accords established a timetable for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops beginning on May 15, 1988 and ending February 15, 1989.9 The United
States predicted that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would be conducted in stages.
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, a central military intelligence branch of
the United States Department of Defense, “The pullout of Soviet forces will probably be
achieved by the successive evacuation of entire garrisons and areas, rather than through
the ‘thinning’ of personnel in units. Larger forces will be turned over to Afghan forces.”10
Half of the Soviet troops would return to the USSR within the first three months of the
withdrawal. Equipment, weapons, ammunition, and fuel would be passed to units of the
Afghan army while armored vehicles would return to the Soviet Union. Once the Afghan
army established a “protective perimeter”, the balance of the Soviet forces would depart
Kabul for the Soviet Union by air and land.11 The Soviet Union planned to withdraw its
military forces from Afghanistan, but rearm the Afghan Army in order to maintain Soviet
influence in the region through the protection of the Communist government regime
under Najibullah in Kabul.
With regard to the Mujahadeen’s response to the withdrawal, the Defense
Intelligence Agency believed that the Mujahadeen would focus their efforts on limiting
the increase in strength of Afghan forces in order to conserve their own. In doing so, it
was argued that the resistance would focus on isolating major government garrisons and
cities, gaining control of supply routes, and stopping any aerial and tactical support to the
Afghan army and their acquired garrisons from the Soviet military. Also, it was
9
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considered that Mujahadeen commanders would encourage Afghan forces to surrender
and negotiate defections to the resistance through constant rocketing of airfields and
missile bombardments.12
During this period, the Afghan government and military were weak. The Afghan
government had never been able to completely fill its armed forces with the appropriate
manpower, and Afghan aircraft and ground vehicles were older and less capable of
competing with the advanced weaponry provided to the Mujahadeen by the U.S. and
Pakistan during the war. The U.S. recognized that, “On the whole, the largely
unmotivated and poorly trained Afghan troops are no match for the Mujahadeen” and
during the later stages of the withdrawal, the U.S. government contended that the
situation in Afghanistan would deteriorate rapidly.13 The CIA and State Department not
only anticipated great rivalry between the resistance and the remaining PDPA
government in Kabul, but also between the Afghan tribes and their leaders that had
gained military and social power during the war. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers
contended that, although it would be difficult, the Mujahadeen would probably capture
the capital of Kabul and create an uneasy coalition of fundamentalists and
traditionalists.14 But, the U.S. government underestimated the importance and impact of
the internal rivalry between leaders of the Mujahadeen and ethnic groups within the
region upon their goal to politically and economically reconstruct Afghanistan in an
American image in the post-war period.
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The United States government was focused on removing the Soviet military from
Afghanistan, confident that the Mujahadeen would remove Najibullah and the Soviet
government in Kabul. Although the U.S. government, particularly the CIA, was aware of
the unrest among fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist resistance leaders, and the
consequences of such discord during the Soviet withdrawal and in the post-war period, it
was clear that once the Soviet military re-entered the Soviet Union in 1989, Afghanistan
would no longer be a priority among U.S. policymakers in the post-war period.
Furthermore, U.S. concern for Pakistan’s influence within Afghanistan would take a back
seat in the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The United States government conducted a foreign
policy strategy similar to that during the initial phases of the war. Parallel to the wait-andsee approach of the U.S. government under President Carter from 1978 to 1981, U.S.
policy makers were again monitoring Soviet military movement, the actions of the
resistance, and were making “rhetorical bows” to the goal of Afghan self-determination.15
However, there was great debate within Washington over whether to continue to
aid and arm the Mujahadeen and particular non-fundamentalist leaders, such as Ahmed
Shah Massoud. Despite the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region and the signing
of the Geneva Accords, there was a majority within the U.S. government, specifically in
the CIA, State Department, National Security Council, and Congress, who contended that
the presence of the Najibullah government in Kabul made a “mockery” of the victory
over the Soviet Union.
Like the government in Pakistan and the ISI, conservative policymakers in
Washington argued for continued military assistance to the Mujahadeen to place pressure
15
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on Najibullah. The conservative political officials of the U.S. government perceived that
continued military assistance to the Mujahadeen in the post-war period would force
Moscow to amend the Geneva Accords and call for the removal of the Soviet government
regime in Kabul, or Najibullah would be forced to withdraw unilaterally.16 However, a
minority of policymakers in the U.S. government believed that “Afghanistan’s future
political course must be left to the Afghan people to decide”, and hoped that Afghans
would be able to develop a process for selecting a government representative of Afghan
society. But, the CIA and State Department, supported by President Reagan, and
powerful members of Congress such as Charles Wilson, Clarence “Doc” Long, and Paul
Tsongas, pressed to continue to support the resistance militarily during the Soviet
withdrawal and in the post-war period on a covert basis.17 According to the U.S. State
Department Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, the United States, “will not
end aid to the Afghan resistance until we are totally satisfied that the Geneva Agreements
will get the Soviets out…and result in a free Afghanistan.”18
On the surface, for the sake of preserving the Geneva Accords and maintaining
positive international opinion, the U.S. began enacting foreign policy for the return of
Afghan refugees from Peshawar to Afghanistan in June of 1988. Approximately three
million Afghans had fled to Pakistan and another two million fled to Iran in the years
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following the Soviet invasion. The U.S. budgeted $119 million in humanitarian assistance
to Afghan refugees through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.19
However, the U.S. government was also creating policies and budgetary measures
for “helping the Afghan people get back on their feet and rebuild their war-devastated
country” through military aid to the Mujahadeen in order to combat the Afghan army and
ultimately overthrow the Soviet government in Kabul.20 This was evidenced in a
concurrent resolution drafted by the House of Representatives to Congress in July of
1988, stating, “U.S. military and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan resistance should
be maintained until the Soviet Union completely withdraws from Afghanistan.”21 In the
context of the Cold War, the United States government wanted to guarantee the selfdetermination of the Afghan people, but on U.S. terms and conditions. In other words,
through continued aid to the Mujahadeen and particular non-fundamentalist leaders
within the resistance, the U.S. aimed to remove the remaining Soviet influence in the
region in order to establish Afghan self-determination while securing and implanting its
own political and economic influence, values, and principles in Afghanistan’s post-war
reconstruction.
The Geneva Accords did not consist of an agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union stating that the U.S. would not continue to intervene in Afghanistan
and with the Mujahadeen. It only specified that Pakistan enter a concession for mutual
relations, non-interference and non-intervention in Afghanistan during the Soviet
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withdrawal. Furthermore, it stated, “should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in
providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the U.S. similarly will exercise
restraint.”22 The Soviet Union however, continued to arm the Afghan Army in order to
protect the PDPA regime under Najibullah in Kabul and as a result, the U.S. provided
military assistance to the Mujahadeen. Whether the U.S. government intentionally
assured that the Geneva Accords did not include a clause barring them from aiding the
Mujahadeen, in anticipation of continuing policies to aid the resistance in the post-war
period, is unclear. At the end of 1988, the only issue for U.S. policy was how far to press
the Soviet Union by continuing to supply the resistance during and after the Soviet troop
withdrawal.
According to the Congressional Research Service in 1988, there were officials in
the U.S. government that argued that “political factors, not material, will determine the
outcome of the internal Afghan conflict, and that the United States should not jeopardize
the Soviet withdrawal and the accord itself…” However, Afghan activists in Washington
argued that the U.S. “must match not only new supplies that the Soviets may send to their
Kabul allies, but also tons of material being left by departing Soviet troops to insure a
victory by the resistance.”23 Although Pakistan, in acknowledgement with the Geneva
Accords, may have limited the flow of weapons, such as the Stinger anti-aircraft missile,
to the Mujahadeen during the Soviet withdrawal, the U.S. government, particularly the
CIA, continued to provide arms to the resistance. The Mujahadeen and the U.S. gave no
indication of any desire to give the Soviet Union a “reprise” or “decent interval” in their
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withdrawal and plan to protect their government regime in Kabul by creating a stronger
Afghan army.24
However, the United States government and Mujahadeen, although aiding one
another in the defeat and removal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, were pursuing
very different goals at that point in the Soviet-Afghan conflict. The Mujahadeen were
using U.S. aid to expedite the Soviet withdrawal from the region and overthrow the
Soviet government under Najibullah. Yet, Mujahadeen leaders such as Ahmed Shah
Massoud, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, used U.S. weaponry
supplied during the war and the Soviet withdrawal to assault not only the Afghan army
protecting the Soviet government in Kabul, but also one another in an attempt to gain
self-determination, power, and control once Najibullah was overthrown.
Although continued military aid to the Mujahadeen and the withdrawal of Soviet
troops led to an increase in the violent conflict between resistance leaders and posed a
threat to relations with the Soviet Union and Pakistan, the status of the Geneva Accords,
and to U.S. influence in the political reconstruction of Afghanistan, the U.S. government
saw the armament of the Mujahadeen through a Cold War lens. For the militarists and
conservative policymakers within the Reagan Administration, continued military
assistance to the Mujahadeen created a Vietnam-type scenario for the Soviet Union,
crippled their remaining influence in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and reaffirmed
that the United States had won the Cold War and was the global hegemon. Moreover, it
affirmed U.S. “exceptionalism” and the sustainability of U.S. values and core ideas
compared to those of the Soviet Union.
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Despite those in the CIA and State Department aware of the growing unrest in
Afghanistan, the U.S. government chose to neglect the civil war rising between
Mujahadeen leaders, who were their only link to Afghanistan in the post-war period.
Indeed, underneath empty promises and slogans for Afghan self-determination, the U.S.
government planned to pursue a policy of nation building in Afghanistan in order to
secure U.S. influence and interests in the region in the post-war period. It would be
conducted first through arming the Mujahadeen to remove the Najibullah government
and then through backing non-fundamentalist leaders, specifically Ahmed Shah Massoud,
whom the U.S. government believed would best promote U.S. interests, values, and
economic and political principles in the region. The U.S. government, however, would
face enormous difficulties, parallel to those experienced by the Soviet Union, as
policymakers continued to follow default rather than long-term policy strategies and
ignored the implications of the situation in Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawal and
in the months following the war’s end. The result would include civil war and the rise of
extreme fundamentalist leaders and organizations promoting anti-American sentiment,
traditional Islamic principles, and regional and international terrorism.
The war did not end with a Soviet withdrawal. By October of 1988, the situation
in Afghanistan was rapidly changing. As the Soviet military was completely withdrawn
from the region by that point in time, the remaining government under Najibullah in
Kabul faced sustained opposition from Mujahadeen forces. Najibullah continually
requested Soviet air strikes and brigades to protect the Soviet government in Kabul and
break Mujahadeen blockades of various regions in Afghanistan such as Kandahar and
Jalalabad. Gorbachev resisted each request made by Najibullah. The Geneva Accords had
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inhibited the Soviet government in Moscow from protecting the government it had
intended to defend.25
However, the Soviet Politburo conducted covert airlifts and military assistance to
the regime in Kabul. The assistance included supplying the Afghan army and agents of
the Soviet Union remaining in Kabul with FROG and SCUD missiles, and $250 to $300
million per month. Thousands of Soviet technicians and military advisors remained
within Kabul to advise the Afghan army in protecting Najibullah and the regime. In
addition, covert combat operations were organized and mines were placed throughout the
Afghan countryside to undermine Pakistan’s and the United States support for the
resistance. The Soviet government in Moscow and in Kabul also conducted a propaganda
campaign blaming the West for the continuation of the Afghan conflict and the continued
unrest within the country.26
Despite the efforts of the Soviet Union to protect their government regime in
Kabul, the United States government did not see them as sufficient. According to a report
by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs in January of 1989, the
resistance was strong and coordinated compared to the weakening Kabul regime.
Pursuant to U.S. government perceptions and estimates of the situation in Afghanistan,
“the past year has seen greater resistance coordination on the battlefield and increased
attention to political issues. An unprecedented number of resistance victories vividly
exposed the weak core of the Kabul regime.”27 In addition, the U.S. government
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contended that the resistance political thinking had “evolved” during the course of the
Soviet withdrawal and the past year.28
By February of 1989, the Afghan resistance had firm control over the Panjshir
Valley, and Kandahar and Jalalabad, Afghanistan’s second and third largest cities.
Furthermore, to facilitate political cohesion in anticipation for the collapse of the Soviet
regime in Kabul, the leaders of the Mujahadeen who were part of the Islamic Unity of the
Afghan Mujahadeen, established an interim government, despite their disputes and
conflict with one another. The Afghan Interim Government or AIG consisted of seven
parties based in Pakistan. The parties included were, Hezbi-Islami (HIG) headed by
Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Hezbi-Islami (HIK) headed by Maulavi Yunis Khalis, JamiatiIslami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ittehadi-Islami headed by Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf,
Harakati-Inqilabi Islami headed by Muhammed Ahmed Nabi, Mahazi-Milli-Islami led by
Ahmad

Gailani,

and

Jabhai-Nijati-Milli-Afghanistan

headed

by

Sebghatullah

Mojaddedi.29
Although the United States government continued to make public statements of
support for Afghan self-determination, and contended that the “US backs no parties or
individuals in this process”, the United States government continued to monitor and
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attempted to achieve control over the political future of Afghanistan.30 The United States
government did not perceive the prospects of the AIG to be very good. Due to internecine
violence between the leaders of the Mujahadeen, specifically Hekmatyar and Massoud, in
the post-war period, the U.S. government contended that the AIG was “most unlikely to
dominate postwar Afghanistan” in 1989. Furthermore, the United States government
viewed the AIG to be “narrowly-based”, alienating many educated Afghans while
supporting religious and traditional fundamentalists. According to Selig S. Harrison’s
testimony to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the U.S. House of Representatives in June of 1989, “The basic dilemma now
confronting Moscow and Washington alike is that neither the Kabul regime nor the
Peshawar government-in-exile established by Pakistan and the United States represent the
majority of Afghans.”31 The U.S. government also perceived the AIG to have a negative
effect on the motivation of resistance commanders to fight as they found themselves
between a government in Kabul which they despised and one in Peshawar that they did
not support.32 The U.S. government contended that a broadening of the interim
government would contribute to increasing the motivation of the military commanders to
fight more aggressively and thus help expedite the removal of the Najibullah regime from
Kabul, and would “swamp both the Communists and Islamic fundamentalists, who now
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enjoy a degree of importance out of all proportion to their following.33 However, in 1989,
the situation in Afghanistan was still uncertain. Yet the U.S. was optimistic, believing
that if the AIG was to fail, it could be replaced or fragmented. Either way, the U.S.
surveyed the status of the AIG, as its outcome impacted not only the future of
Afghanistan, but also U.S. policies in the region.34
In the months following the formation of the AIG, the conflict between leaders of
the Mujahadeen, particularly Hekmatyar and Massoud, intensified, as did assaults on the
Soviet regime in Kabul. Despite their unified objective and commitment to creating a
more representative government of the people or shura, the AIG was divided on how this
should be achieved. U.S. concerns about the AIG proved valid as the AIG failed to
develop a cohesive program with broad Afghan appeal, and further intensified
competition and conflict between members and leaders of the Mujahadeen. The AIG
ultimately split apart in late 1989. The United States pursued policies supporting Afghan
self-determination but searched for a “political settlement” that was both “reasonable”
and “possible”. For U.S. officials at the end of 1989, the most “desirable option” was a
“transfer of power from Najibullah and the AIG to a neutral interim government, leading
to elections for a new Afghan-wide assembly that can decide on a new political system
for Afghanistan.”35 The U.S. believed this could be done if the Mujahadeen leaders
changed their idea of a proper government in Afghanistan to make it more acceptable to
key military commanders, particularly Ahmed Shah Massoud, Afghan minority
communities, supporters of the former king, and representatives in regime-controlled
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territory.36 U.S. officials and political analysts such as Selig S. Harrison, contended that a
broadening of the interim government would contribute to increasing the motivation of
the military commanders to fight more aggressively and thus help expedite the removal
of the Najibullah regime from Kabul, and would “swamp both the Communists and
Islamic fundamentalists, who now enjoy a degree of importance out of all proportion to
their following”.37
However, this appeared unlikely to many within the new Bush Administration,
the CIA, and the State Department. As evidenced by Zalmay Khalilzad’s testimony
before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee of Foreign
Relations, although U.S. officials and advisors considered the balance of power to be
favorable for the Mujahadeen, there was growing concern that commanders adopted a
“wait and see attitude in the hope of encouraging the AIG leaders to accept powersharing arrangements”.38 Moreover, according to Khalilzad, officials in the Bush
Administration believed that Soviet military aid to the Afghan Army, especially Scud
missiles, created a “qualitative imbalance between Kabul and its opponents”.39 The U.S.
government argued and impressed upon the Mujahadeen that their main military strategy
be to isolate the Kabul regime and increase tension between it and the Afghan populace.
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“A strategy of incremental strangulation—increasing pressure on cities by blocking
roads, keeping airports under attack, conducting special operations against government
facilities inside cities and mounting discriminating attacks from the outside can serve the
Mujahadeen’s purpose well.”40 To achieve this, the U.S. further encouraged the
Mujahadeen to improve their coordination and develop strategies for the defection of
those within the Kabul regime.41 In doing so, the U.S. government, specifically the Bush
Administration and the CIA, pursued a policy to provide military aid to Mujahadeen
while attempting to establish a more broad Afghan Interim Government that not only
represented Islam but also and more importantly, would project American values and
ideals in Afghanistan. For Selig S. Harrison, U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan in the
post-war period carried “unacceptable moral as well as political costs. Such a policy is, in
effect, a policy of ‘fighting to the last Afghan’ in the misguided pursuit of perceived
American geopolitical objectives that can be achieved more through political and
diplomatic means”.42 As a result, the U.S. government furthered the divisions and
violence between fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists in Afghanistan.43
At the end of 1989, the United States government did not perceive the
Mujahadeen to be ready to govern Afghanistan effectively. Congress focused on
continuing to supply the Mujahadeen until the Najibullah government was overthrown
and expressed interest in supporting multiple moderate Mujahadeen leaders to establish a
broad Afghan interim government, but the CIA and State Department began searching for
40

Zalmay Khalilzad, “Afghanistan After Soviet Military Withdrawal- Testimony before the Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations,” 1989, 4.
41 Ibid, 5.
42 Selig S. Harrison, “What Next in Afghanistan- Testimony for the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and U.S. House of Representatives,” 1989, 15, Digitial National
Security Archive- Item # AF02291.
43 Ibid, 9-10.

89

other options. Although Congress, and the CIA and State Department were preparing
policies for Afghanistan’s future leadership after Najibullah was removed, his regime still
remained in Kabul from 1990 to 1991. During this period, despite its deficiencies, the
Mujahadeen mounted numerous attacks and gained significant ground in Khost, Herat,
Kandahar, and Kabul. Najibullah was hanging on by a thread and was suffering from the
diminishment of Soviet aid. On the surface, the United States government continued to
follow its policy agenda established since 1988. The U.S. State Department, although
cognizant of the extreme division between Najibullah and the resistance, publicized
American interest in an “initiation of dialogue between those active in the resistance and
those Afghans now residing under regime control” in order to create Afghan selfdetermination, a representative Afghan government, and a non-aligned Afghan nation.44
However, the CIA believed, as it had before, that it should persist in supporting
the Mujahadeen movement against the Najibullah regime, and thus, continued to conduct
covert operations to finance and arm resistance groups and leaders, specifically Ahmed
Shah Massoud. The CIA concentrated on elevating Ahmed Shah Massoud and his forces
to gain power and control of the government in Kabul. Despite the fact that Pakistan was
still a base from which the CIA launched its covert operations, in Afghanistan, CIA
operations, particularly those orchestrated with Massoud, were kept hidden from the
Pakistani government under Benazir Bhutto and the ISI. The ISI, in turn, despite
restrictions on the level of involvement Pakistan, was able to have in Afghanistan under
the Geneva Accords and the setbacks of President Zia’s death in 1988, continued to
funnel arms and money to the resistance. Although the ISI and CIA continued to arm the
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resistance movement to overthrow Najibullah, they were still divided as a result of the ISI
policy to support Hekmatyar, while the CIA armed and funded Massoud.45
Between 1988 and 1989, although the number of incidents of international
terrorism was gradually declining, U.S. interests continued to be the most frequent targets
by international terrorists usually arising out of the Middle East. In 1989, 165 attacks
were recorded against U.S. interests in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Western
Europe.46 According to the U.S. State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, “Despite the decline in international attacks in 1989, terrorists retain
the potential for resuming a greater level of violence, particularly against the United
States.”47 Even though there was fear and discomfort among members of the CIA and
State Department towards the numbers of extreme jihadists arising within the ranks of the
Mujahadeen and contributing to international terrorism, particularly against the U.S., CIA
covert activities in Afghanistan did not stop. The CIA and State Department chose to
disregard that their continued influence and presence in Afghanistan, although beneficial
for the Mujahadeen in their pursuit to remove Najibullah, fueled anti-American sentiment
and acts of terror emanating from extreme fundamentalists in the resistance and across
Afghanistan.
The CIA, throughout 1990 and into early 1991, continued to fund Massoud and
resistance groups without the assistance of the Pakistani government or the ISI. The CIA
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covert budget for Afghanistan in 1990 totaled between $300 and $400 million.48 The CIA
was providing military and monetary assistance to Massoud specifically, indicating, but
not openly stating, that he was the best leader and military commander to unite the
Afghan people, form a representative Afghan government, and combat extreme
fundamentalists such as Hekmatyar, backed by the ISI, while promoting U.S. interests in
the region. In accordance with this argument by the CIA, Peter Tomsen, the ambassador
of the U.S to Afghanistan at the time, proposed and initiated a two-track plan to the
situation in Afghanistan. The first recommended that the State Department hold political
negotiations aimed at “sidelining extremists”, particularly Hekmatyar and Sayyaf. The
second entailed the overthrow of Najibullah by assisting Afghan rebel forces, particularly
those under the command of Massoud. As demonstrated by Steve Coll, although the CIA
continued to work with the ISI to aid the Mujahadeen, they independently provided
money and weapons directly to Afghan commanders under Massoud. For the United
States government, specifically the CIA and the State Department, the interim
government of Afghanistan would eventually be replaced by military leaders such as
Massoud, Abdul Haq, and Ismail Khan.49
As the assault against Najibullah persisted, Hekmatyar, receiving aid from
Pakistan, and Massoud, receiving aid from the U.S., began to acquire and compete for
territory surrounding Kabul.50 A covert war for influence between the United States and
Pakistan, and a civil war for power in Afghanistan was well underway by mid-1991.
However, the U.S. government was hindered in its efforts to remove Najibullah and
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foster the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan, as Massoud and the
Mujahadeen were distracted by the civil war for power rather than removing Najibullah.
Furthermore, Congress limited their appropriations to the CIA. By mid-1991, Congress
had cut the CIA’s finding for their covert war by approximately 60% to a total of $280
million.51 The CIA’s covert war was drifting to the outskirts of Washington’s
bureaucracy, as the fall of the Soviet Union and the reconstruction of East and West
Germany under U.S. influence became a primary focus for policy makers.52
The Cold War jihad alliance between the United States government and the
Mujahadeen was unraveling due to uncertainty, Islamic radicalism, and the pursuit of
power. The Middle East and the civil war raging between Massoud and Hekmatyar posed
serious risks for United States security, U.S. allies in the Middle East, and U.S. influence
in Afghanistan. This was evident as Hekmatyar began to stage massive assaults on Kabul
itself with sophisticated long-range rockets supplied to him through the ISI. In addition,
as Pakistan began programs for nuclear proliferation, the possibility that such technology
could find its way into the hands of radical Islamic extremists and fundamentalists such
as Hekmatyar became a concern of the CIA. Despite the end of the Afghan-Soviet War,
the risks to U.S. security and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the rest of
the government was still focused on Cold War politics. As radically violent and antiAmerican Islamic fundamentalists such as Hekmatyar and Osama Bin Laden began to
rise in Afghanistan, and acquire more volunteers and modern military technology, the
U.S. government, with the exception of the CIA and State Department, ignored this due
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to their pursuit to secure the fall of the Soviet Union, enhance U.S. hegemony, create a
sphere of influence in Germany, and monitor the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait.
On January 1, 1992, after the fall of the Najibullah regime, the CIA’s legal
authority to conduct covert operations in Afghanistan officially ended. With the incoming
Clinton Administration, the situation in Afghanistan was no longer a priority in the U.S.
policy agenda and was replaced by a focus on U.S. domestic policy. After years of
monetary and military aid, and expectations for the creation and reconstruction of a stable
Afghan government and Afghanistan under the umbrella of U.S. ideas, values and
systems, the United States government perceived that such pursuits for the future of
Afghanistan were no longer legitimate. In a country devoted to Islamic ideology which
has meaning that can be interpreted in multiple ways and can be used for peaceful and
violent purposes by the overlapping multiethnic and diverse population of Afghanistan,
establishing a stable government under American influence proved problematic.53
Furthermore, not only was the task of refugee repatriation and physical reconstruction of
Afghanistan difficult, but also the remodeling of the Afghan political and economic
system posed a challenge too great for the U.S. government. The agreement between
Mujahadeen leaders to share power in Kabul with the overthrow of Najibullah was
clearly a failed promise due to the violent religious and ideological competition for
political power waged between leaders such as Massoud and Hekmatyar. Factions and
leaders of the Mujahadeen intended to gain power individually through civil war and
weaponry received by the U.S. and Pakistan.
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It is the civil war and these cultural and political implications in Afghanistan in
the early 1990’s that led U.S. policy makers to realize that an internationally legitimate
and stable government and army in Afghanistan could not be created and if it was, could
not last long.54 Moreover, since the Afghan-Soviet War concluded, the Soviet Union had
disintegrated and the rise of Islamic radical threats as a result of U.S. influence in region
posed a threat to U.S. security and the American public, the U.S. government perceived
that aiding the Mujahadeen, remaining in Afghanistan, and pursuing a policy of nation
building was a risky and unnecessary cost to the nation.55
However, it must be recognized that the United States government facilitated its
own failure in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The United States
government, blinded by ambition, U.S. “exceptionalism”, and Cold War politics,
channeled military arms and money to groups that were, at best, partially reliable and
organized, in order to serve American interests at that moment. The United States
government dealt with multiethnic and tribal groups and leaders that, although united in a
common effort to defeat the Soviet Union, were not bound to one another in the post-war
period. U.S. policy makers failed to realize early enough that the Afghan-Soviet War was
only the first step of a much larger and difficult conflict to establish peace and stability in
the region. Furthermore, U.S. officials recognized too late that the cultural, social, and
religious roots in Afghanistan could not be so easily dislodged by covert military arms
agreements, money, and American diplomacy, ideals, values, and systems of government.
In 1992, with the Soviet Union dissolved, the Najibullah government abandoned
in Kabul, and the withdrawal of U.S. influence in Afghanistan, the Afghan future was
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determined by civil war between Mujahadeen volunteers, Massoud and Hekmatyar. The
results would prove to be devastating for the Afghan people, its international status and
its political and economic stability. As evidenced by recent history, the results of U.S.
perceptions and policy during the Afghan-Soviet War and in the years after Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan furthered the chaos and rise of terrorism and terrorist
coalitions,

such

as

the

Taliban,

within
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the

region

and

abroad

today.

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan was a victim of the Cold War, but it was the United States that
became the ultimate victim. Although the geostrategic conflict between the Soviet Union
and the United States that was played out in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War
led to an American victory in the Cold War and Afghanistan to success in removing the
Soviet Union from the region, it also created the military and social chaos that gripped
the nation from the post-war period to the present day. The implications and
consequences of this failure has greatly impacted the most recent history of the United
States.
U.S. policies and strategy during the Afghan-Soviet War were made under a Cold
War context and mindset. During the Afghan-Soviet War, the United States armed and
funded “holy warriors” or fighters within the Mujahadeen to effectively combat and repel
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The United States government conducted this policy
covertly through the CIA, the State Department, and the National Security Council in
conjunction with the Pakistani government and ISI. Throughout the war and well into the
post-war period, agents within the CIA and State Department organized the training of
Afghan Mujahadeen fighters to tactically use the most sophisticated weaponry of the
decade. The U.S. government provided monetary and military aid to the Mujahadeen,
while training resistance fighters to properly use assault rifles, rockets, grenades, Stinger
anti-aircraft missiles, briefcase bombs, car bombs, and other explosives to physically and
psychologically cripple and defeat Soviet military forces in the region.
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Although this policy and strategy served U.S. interests during the war, the
continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan in the post-war period and aid to the Mujahadeen
contributed to the division of Afghan society, the rise of well-armed and well-funded
extreme Islamic fundamentalists, and the inability of the United States government to
successfully enact a policy of nation building to establish a stable Afghan government
based on U.S. political and economic values, ideas, and principles. Furthermore, U.S.
strategy during the Afghan-Soviet War and in the post-war period, fostered antiAmerican sentiment in the region, which ultimately developed into acts of terror against
the U.S.
There are several questions to consider when looking at U.S. foreign policy
during this period of history. Could the U.S. government have conducted a different and
more effective strategy with regards to Afghanistan during and after the Afghan-Soviet
War? What were the major pitfalls of such a U.S. policy? Does the U.S. government need
to change its policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East?
The United States government could have administered a different and more
effective strategy with regards to the situation in Afghanistan during and after the
Afghan-Soviet War. The larger Cold War engagement with the Soviet Union during the
Afghan-Soviet War blurred American policymaker’s sensibilities towards the true
aspirations of the Afghan people, the political and economic disorganization of the
Afghan nation, the importance of Afghan traditionalist values, religion, ideology, and
ethnicity to the political and social fabric of the country, and the internal conflict among
Islamic social group, their leaders, and more importantly the leaders of the Mujahadeen
within Afghanistan.

98

However, that is not to say that the arming and supplying of the Mujahadeen
during the war was not necessary or imperative in order to stem the obvious Soviet goal
to subjugate Afghanistan to Communism and use the region as a base to further spread
Soviet influence and ideals across the Middle East diplomatically and if need be,
militarily. If not for the United States, the Afghan Mujahadeen would not have been
capable of effectively resisting and reversing Soviet military aggression and expansion.
The money and advanced weaponry supplied by the United States to the Mujahadeen
through Pakistan and the ISI was necessary and was the key to success during the war.
However, the continuation of supplies of the Mujahadeen in the post-war period, albeit
limited, proved to be a risky strategy for U.S. interests, security, and goals for continued
involvement in the region to the present day.
In the post-war period, the United States government hoped and perceived that its
efforts to aid the Mujahadeen and secure the overthrow of Najibullah during and after the
war, would translate into support and the success of nation building policies in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan, during and after the war, proved to be a prime example of a
country in need of nation building and was perceived as a region that could further U.S.
security, interests, and hegemony in the Middle East and internationally. Although it was
supported by the Soviet Union prior to the invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was a
politically and economically unstable region, torn and divided by civil unrest, and tribal
and ethnic violence and conflict. With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the country was
further devastated by the advanced Soviet military technology used in their assaults
throughout the country. Despite the unification of the Afghan people towards defeating
the Soviet Union, there were lasting divisions between members and leaders of the
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Mujahadeen who represented different ethnic and tribal groups, and sects of the Islamic
faith. This limited the stability and economic and political progress of the country.
The Soviet invasion and the Afghan-Soviet War proved to be a major opportunity
for the United States to not only gain an upper hand in the Cold War against the Soviet
Union, but also to enact direct policies geared towards improving U.S.-Afghan relations
and U.S. influence in the Middle East, and more specifically, nation building in
Afghanistan. Throughout the Afghan-Soviet War and in its aftermath, the United States
properly approached its policy goals in Afghanistan multilaterally rather than unilaterally,
calling upon the assistance of Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the United
States had the economic and military resources to successfully ensure a lasting program
to aid and arm the Mujahadeen, and rebuild Afghanistan during the war and in its
aftermath. Yet, this plan backfired and strengthened the regimes of extreme Islamic
fundamentalists and organizations that were traditional and religious in their thinking and
practices and anti-American in their sentiment.
Morover, “Afghanistan after 1979 was a laboratory for political and military
visions conceived abroad and imposed by force.”1 The United States perceived that
Afghanistan could be exploited during the war in order to defeat the Soviet Union and
then transformed in the post-war period into an ally and a nation that emulated American
political, social, and economic ideals, values, and principles. Although this was possible
during and after the war, the U.S. government missed their opportunity to do so as their
foreign policy was shaped by “indifference, lassitude, blindness, paralysis, and
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commercial greed”.2 The United States government championed many groups, leaders,
and members of the Mujahadeen during the war and in the post-war era. However, there
were few convincing nationalists within the region willing to place their interests, and the
interests of their tribe or ethnic group, behind that of Afghanistan’s. Although this
suggests that Afghanistan may not have been a suitable candidate for nation building,
agents within the CIA and State Department recognized this and continued to push
forward with attempts to rebuild the political and economic infrastructure of Afghanistan
in an American image. Moreover, in the early 1990’s, the CIA and State Department
continued to implement its policies and strategy militarily rather than diplomatically with
no clear or defined exit strategy from the region.
Although Ahmed Shah Massoud might have been the only true Afghan nationalist
during and after the Afghan-Soviet, he could not create the Afghanistan that the United
States hoped would develop once the Soviet Union withdrew and Najibullah’s regime
collapsed. Massoud, like many of the other leaders of the Mujahadeen competing for
power at the end of the war and in the early 1990’s, was very independent in character
and conduct, and was tied to the Islamic faith and principles.3 Even though this inhibited
the U.S. government’s ability to control his ascension to power and how he would rebuild
Afghanistan once he established himself as the leader, U.S. officials proceeded with
policies to fund and arm him. The United States government perceived that this was a
better alternative to the radical Islamist vision of Afghanistan pursued by Pakistan in their
support of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar.
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U.S. policy makers carried on the policies, perceptions, and Cold War politics of
the Afghan-Soviet War into the early 1990’s. The United States armed the Mujahadeen
and its leaders, both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist, during and after the war,
despite the focus on Massoud. Although this proved successful in accomplishing the U.S.
short-term policy agenda and interests, in the long run this strategy fostered the rise of a
devastating civil war in Afghanistan, which inhibited and ended any hope of U.S.
officials to successfully execute a policy of nation building in the region. Indeed, it was a
poor strategy, and only at the war’s end and too late in the scheme of things for the
United States to employ a strategy for the democratization, and political, social and
economic development of Afghanistan in an American image. The population of
Afghanistan was demoralized and was divided, not only in their ethnic and tribal roots,
but also in their support for different leaders of the Mujahadeen who expressed moderate
and radical ideas for incorporating Islam into the country’s political and economic
infrastructure.
Despite the risk of pursuing a policy of American style-nation building among a
divided populace engaged in civil war in Afghanistan, the U.S. government indulged in
support for leaders and Islamic regimes that were undemocratic, corrupt, and bound to
religious ideals and principles that clashed with American core ideas and systems. In
addition, the U.S. government aligned itself with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in order to
facilitate greater support for their efforts in Afghanistan in the 1990’s. Although Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia had significant influence in the region, there was evidence that both
countries promoted the incorporation of traditional Islamic principles into the political
and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, and extreme Islamic fundamentalists that
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were members of organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, and AlQaeda.4 As a result, U.S. policymakers enabled the development and rise of extreme
Islamic fundamentalists and organizations such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda by focusing
on the larger geostrategic engagement with the Soviet Union during the war and
following Cold War politics and policies in the post-war period.5
The United States policy in the Middle East, specifically in Afghanistan, during
and after the Afghan-Soviet War, was “based on some real and changing national
interests rather than any immutable abstract principles. There is often a large gap between
propaganda and actual policy.”6 During the war and in the post-war period, U.S. policy
was consistent, but pursued “overlapping, conflicting, or inconsistent economic, political,
and strategic interests”.7 On paper, U.S. policy objectives during the war were aimed at
securing Afghanistan’s self-determination. However, the real policy goals of U.S.
officials included assuring a flow of oil to the U.S., protecting the security of Middle East
allies and Israel, and most importantly, ensuring continued U.S. influence in Afghanistan
and the Middle East by containing Soviet expansion. The importance of these U.S.
interests shifted during and after the war depending on the policymakers preferences and
the changing situation and war effort in Afghanistan.8 There was and is a need for a
balance of U.S. policy objectives and goals. Furthermore, U.S. officials ignored the
political realities that ultimately distorted their foreign policy objectives in the region.
This specifically pertains to U.S. covert operations during and after the war that exploited
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ethnic and tribal tensions, and individual power rivalries. In the pursuit to reshape
Afghanistan in an American image and as part of an integrated international system under
American influence, U.S. policymakers ignored the regions history, heritage, and
dynamic cultural framework.
The U.S. government, like the Soviet Union, tried and continues to pursue
policies to re-engineer the Afghan society and contain yet promote resurgent Islam.
However, with such parallels in policy, the United States encounters the same problems
which have continued to the present day. The Cold War patterns and politics have
persisted in U.S. policy in the region, when the end of the Cold War could have marked a
more peaceful transition of power, influence, and perception on the part of the United
States. Although it has been heavily debated in the past and today, U.S. policy towards
the Middle East and Afghanistan needs to be reviewed and re-evaluated. Yet even in the
turbulence of conflict and struggle in the region, there are lessons from the past, which
foster greater hope for the future.
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